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All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'works' and 'Short History of Modern Philosophy'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4)
     A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Weber coined the distinction between explanation and clarification, saying that natural phenomena require causal explanation, while social phenomena require clarification by giving reasons or offering possible motives for how things are.
     From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.7
     A reaction: This is music to the ears of property dualists and other non-reductivists, but if you go midway in the hierarchy of animals (a mouse, say) the distinction blurs. Weber probably hadn't digested Darwin, whose big impact came around 1905.
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]
     Full Idea: Weber contends that modern western civilisation is 'disenchanted' because our society's method of arriving at beliefs about the world, that is, the sciences, is unable to address questions of value.
     From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 6
     A reaction: This idea, made explicit by Hume's empirical attitude to values, is obviously of major importance. For we Aristotelians values are a self-evident aspect of nature. Boulter says philosophy has added to the disenchantment. I agree.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog)
     A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14)
     A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights.