Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Realism and Anti-Realism' and 'The Definition of Good'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The anti-realist view undercuts the ground for accepting bivalence. ...Acceptance of bivalence should not be taken as a sufficient condition for realism. ..They accept the weaker principle that unambiguous statements are determinately true or not true.
     From: Michael Dummett (Realism and Anti-Realism [1992], p.467)
     A reaction: [cited by Kit Fine, when discussing anti-realism] I take it be quite an important component of realism that there might be facts which will never be expressed, or are even beyond our capacity to grasp or express them
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
     Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.
     From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4
     A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.