18 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The history of philosophy up to now is nothing but a history of attempts to discover how to do philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 01) | |
A reaction: I take post-Fregean analytic metaphysics to be another experiment in how to do philosophy. I suspect that the experiment of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida etc has been a failure. |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
Full Idea: All philosophy begins where philosophizing philosophises itself. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 79) | |
A reaction: The modern trend for doing metaphilosophy strikes me as wholly admirable, though I suspect that the enemies of philosophy (who are legion) see it as a decadence. |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
Full Idea: A problem is a solid, synthetic mass which is broken up by means of the penetrating power of the mind. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 04) |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Whoever first understood how to count to two, even if he still found it difficult to keep on counting, saw nonetheless the possibility of infinite counting according to the same laws. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 84) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is the discerning of the 'law' which triggers this. Is the key concept 'addition' or 'successor' (or are those the same?). |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Novalis came to think that the kind of existence , or 'being', that is disclosed in self-consciousness remains, as it were, forever out of our reach because of the kind of temporal creatures we are. | |
From: report of Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06 | |
A reaction: It looks here as if Novalis kicked Heidegger's Dasein into the long grass before it even got started, but maybe they have different notions of 'being', with Novalis seeking timeless being, and Heidegger, influenced by Bergson, accepting temporality. |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Poetry is true idealism - contemplation of the world as contemplation of a large mind - self-consciousness of the universe. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], vol 3 p.640), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism | |
A reaction: It looks like the step from Fichte's idealism to the Absolute is poetry, which embraces the ultimate Spinozan substance through imagination. Or something... |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
Full Idea: The semantic approach contends that theoretical models ...are candidates for representing physical systems by virtue of the fact that they stand in mapping relations to corresponding data-models. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: Sounds like a neat and satisfying picture. |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
Full Idea: The 'received view' of models is that they are Tarskian formal axiomatic calculi interpreted by meta-mathematical models. The 'semantic' view of models gives equal importance to their representational capacity. | |
From: report of Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'background') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The Tarskian view is the one covered in my section on Model Theory. Portides favours the semantic account, and I am with him all the way. Should models primarily integrate with formal systems, or with the world? Your choice... |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
Full Idea: Models are representational, independently of the strength of their relation to theory, depending on how well they achieve the purpose of providing explanations for what occurs in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound quite right. It seems possible to have a perfect representation of a system which remains quite baffling (because too complex, or with obscure ingredients). Does the stylised London tube map explain well but represent badly? |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
Full Idea: The unified model can be considered a better representation of the atomic nucleus in comparison to the liquid-drop and shell models, because it explains most of the known results about the nucleus. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: The point here is that models are evaluated not just by their accuracy, but by their explanatory power. Presumably a great model is satisfying and illuminating. Do the best models capture the essence of a thing? |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
Full Idea: A better understanding of 'model', as used in science, could be achieved if we examine it as a member of the triad of concepts of representation, idealisation and abstraction. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Abstraction seems to have a bad name in philosophy, and yet when you come to discuss things like models, you can't express it any other way. |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
Full Idea: 'Theory-driven' models are constructed in a systematic theory-regulated way by supplementing the theoretical calculus with locally operative hypotheses. 'Phenomenological' models deploy semi-empirical results, with ad hoc hypotheses, and extra concepts. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am not at all clear about this distinction, even after reading his whole article. The first type of model seems more general, while the second seems tuned to particular circumstances. He claims the second type is more explanatory. |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
Full Idea: If theoretical models are highly abstract and idealised descriptions of phenomena, they may only represent general features, and fail to explain the specific mechanisms at work in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: [compressed] While there may be an ideal theory that explains everything, it sounds right capturing the actual mechanism (such as the stirrup bone in the ear) is not at all theoretical. |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Every person has his own language. Language is the expression of the spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 91) | |
A reaction: Nice to see someone enthusiastically affirming what was later famously denied, and maybe even disproved. |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Without philosophy there is no true morality, and without morality no philosophy. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 21) | |
A reaction: Challenging! Maybe unthinking people drift in a sea of vague untethered morality, and people who seem to have a genuine moral strength are always rooted in some sort of philosophy. Maybe. Is the passion for philosophy a moral passion? |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Life must not be a novel that is given to us, but one that is made by us. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 99) | |
A reaction: The roots of existentialism are in the Romantic movement. Sartre seems to have taken this idea literally. |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
Full Idea: If a pupil genuinely desires truth is requires only a hint to show him how to find what he is seeking. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments I [1798], 02) | |
A reaction: The tricky job for the teacher or supervisor is assessing whether the pupil genuinely desires truth, or needs motivating. |