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6855
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Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
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A reaction:
I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
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6856
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Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
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A reaction:
Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
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5655
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Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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