Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Thought and Responsibility' and 'A Specimen of Discoveries'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75)
     A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80)
     A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
     Full Idea: A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
     From: Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
     A reaction: Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78)
     A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument.