7 ideas
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The difficulties historically attributed to the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: The law of excluded middle was a target for the intuitionists, so presumably the debate went off in that direction. |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The finitist may have no conception of function, because functions are transfinite objects. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §4) | |
A reaction: He is offering a view of Tait's. Above my pay scale, but it sounds like a powerful objection to the finitist view. Maybe there is a finitist account of functions that could be given? |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course. |
21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego. | |
From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito. |
21215 | The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness. | |
From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3) | |
A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
21219 | Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos. | |
From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them. |