Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'On Husserl' and 'Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics''

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5 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3)
     A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
     Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
     A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them.