Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Causality and Explanation' and 'talk'

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3 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: For Salmon mechanisms are composed of processes and interactions. The interactions are identified in terms of transmitted marks and statistical relations, or (more recently) exchanges of conserved quantities.
     From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causality and Explanation [1998], 3.1) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 3.1
     A reaction: They say that Salmon has too little to say about the activities that constitute a mechanism. A 'mark' doesn't sound too promising, but I quite like the exchange of conserved quantities, which gets into the guts of what is going on.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]
     Full Idea: A common modern reductive view of the mind is that a hierarchy of intentional systems eventually produce qualia, but it might be the other way around. The mind is 'qualia-upon-qualia', with units of minimal qualia building up into intentional thought.
     From: Harry Gildersleve (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: If qualia are seen as existing at the most basic level of the brain, this may well imply panpsychism. It certainly says that basic brain cells are capable of minimal experiences. The idea that thought is essentially qualitative is very intriguing.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).