13 ideas
10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Late nineteenth century mathematicians said that, although plus, minus and 0 could not be precisely defined, they could be partially 'implicitly defined' as a group. This nonsense was rejected by Frege and others, as expressed in Russell 1903. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is helpful in understanding what is going on in Frege's 'Grundlagen'. I won't challenge Hodges's claim that such definitions are nonsense, but there is a case for understanding groups of concepts together. |
10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: In first-order languages the completeness theorem tells us that T |= φ holds if and only if there is a proof of φ from T (T |- φ). Since the two symbols express the same relationship, theorist often just use |- (but only for first-order!). | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: [actually no spaces in the symbols] If you are going to study this kind of theory of logic, the first thing you need to do is sort out these symbols, which isn't easy! |
10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: If every structure which is a model of a set of sentences T is also a model of one of its sentences φ, then this is known as the model-theoretic consequence relation, and is written T |= φ. Not to be confused with |= meaning 'satisfies'. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 10474, which gives the other meaning of |=, as 'satisfies'. The symbol is ALSO used in propositional logical, to mean 'tautologically implies'! Sort your act out, logicians. |
10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: The symbol in 'I |= S' reads that if the interpretation I (about word meaning) happens to make the sentence S state something true, then I 'is a model for' S, or I 'satisfies' S. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately this is not the only reading of the symbol |= [no space between | and =!], so care and familiarity are needed, but this is how to read it when dealing with models. See also Idea 10477. |
10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: The models in model-theory are structures, but there is also a common use of 'model' to mean a formal theory which describes and explains a phenomenon, or plans to build it. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 5) | |
A reaction: Hodges is not at all clear here, but the idea seems to be that model-theory offers a set of objects and rules, where the common usage offers a set of descriptions. Model-theory needs homomorphisms to connect models to things, |
10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Model theory is the study of the interpretation of any language, formal or natural, by means of set-theoretic structures, with Tarski's truth definition as a paradigm. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: My attention is caught by the fact that natural languages are included. Might we say that science is model theory for English? That sounds like Quine's persistent message. |
10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A 'structure' in model theory is an interpretation which explains what objects some expressions refer to, and what classes some quantifiers range over. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites as examples 'first-order structures' used in mathematical model theory, and 'Kripke structures' used in model theory for modal logic. A structure is also called a 'universe'. |
10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is hopeless for discriminating between one infinite cardinal and another. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: This seems rather significant, since mathematics largely relies on first-order logic for its metatheory. Personally I'm tempted to Ockham's Razor out all these super-infinities, but mathematicians seem to make use of them. |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2) | |
A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story. |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5) | |
A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another. |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242) | |
A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary. |