10 ideas
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8) | |
A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many. |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1) | |
A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding. |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm. |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4) | |
A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power? |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour. |
7598 | Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism [Zoroaster, by Armstrong,K] |
Full Idea: Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism. | |
From: report of Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the consensus on the origins of monotheism, which places the development much earlier than the appearance of the idea in Greek philosophy. |
7472 | Zarathustra was the first to present a god who is an abstract concept [Zoroaster] |
Full Idea: Zarathustra's achievement was for the first time to present a god who is an abstract concept - he broke with the tradition of a pantheon of gods. | |
From: Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]), quoted by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.05 | |
A reaction: The more abstract the gods become, the harder it is to challenge their existence. |
20672 | Zoroastrianism saw the world as a battle between good evil gods [Zoroaster, by Harari] |
Full Idea: Zoroastrianism saw the world as a cosmic battle between the good god Ahura Mazda and the evil god Angra Mainyu. | |
From: report of Zoroaster (The Gathas (seventeen hymns) [c.900 BCE]) by Yuval Noah Harari - Sapiens: brief history of humankind 12 'Battle' | |
A reaction: Hm. This contradicts the impression I had gained that it was monotheist. |