10 ideas
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
17402 | Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
Full Idea: Mendeleev rejected one unifying principles in favour of three basic components of nature: matter (substance), force (energy), and spirit (soul). 'Spirit' is said to be what we now mean by essentialism - what is irreducibly peculiar to the object. | |
From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' |
17399 | Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev] |
Full Idea: Neither mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in mercury oxide; it only contains the substance of the elements, just as steam only contains the substance of ice. | |
From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870], I:23), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Nature' | |
A reaction: [1889 edn] Scerri glosses the word 'substance' as meaning essence. |
17400 | Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
Full Idea: Because he was attempting to classify abstract elements, not simple substances, Mendeleev was not misled by nonessential chemical properties. | |
From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' | |
A reaction: I'm not fully clear about this, but I take it that Mendeleev stood back from the messy observations, and tried to see the underlying simpler principles. 'Simple substances' were ones that had not so far been decomposed. |
17401 | Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev] |
Full Idea: His view of elements allowed Mendeleev to maintain the validity of the periodic table even in instances where observational evidence seemed to point against it. | |
From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' | |
A reaction: Mendeleev seems to have focused on abstract essences of elements, rather than on the simplest substances they had so far managed to isolate. |