12126
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People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
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A reaction:
I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
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8329
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Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here.
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5692
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Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
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Full Idea:
Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
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From:
David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
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A reaction:
This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
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12125
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Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
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A reaction:
This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
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8324
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The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it?
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8328
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Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy.
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8325
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The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either.
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12118
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Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
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A reaction:
I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
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