12742
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A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds.
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23304
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The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
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Full Idea:
The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
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From:
Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
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A reaction:
The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.
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23303
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Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
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Full Idea:
Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
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From:
Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
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A reaction:
An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.
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12126
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People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
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A reaction:
I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
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12125
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Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
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A reaction:
This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
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12118
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Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
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A reaction:
I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
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