19 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
Full Idea: That knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
A reaction: A surprising view, coming from the father of modern science, but essentially correct. Obviously metaphysics aspires to avoid multiplicity, but it is riddled not only with complexity in its researches, but massive uncertainties. |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
A reaction: The father of modern science keeps a place for metaphysics, as the most abstract level above the physical sciences. I would say he is right. It leads to my own slogan: science is the servant of philosophy. |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
A reaction: He cites the ancients for this view, with which he agrees. One could do worse than hang onto metaphysics as the study of necessities, but must then face the attacks of the Quineans - that knowledge of necessities is beyond us. |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Physic inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and metaphysic handleth the formal and final causes. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 12119. This divides up Aristotle's famous Four Causes (or Explanations), outlined in 'Physics' II.3. The concept of 'matter', and the nature of 'cause' seem to me to fall with the purview of metaphysics. Interesting, though. |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5) | |
A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way. |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
Full Idea: All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.1) | |
A reaction: After several hundred years, I doubt whether anyone can come up with a better account of scientific method than Bacon's. |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
Full Idea: The ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.5) | |
A reaction: He gives as his example that the Copernican system and the Ptolemaic system both seem to satisfy all the facts. He wrote in 1605, just before Galileo's telescope. His point is regularly made in modern discussions. In this case, he was wrong! |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
Full Idea: It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1) | |
A reaction: I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail. |
23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |
23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |
From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Progress demands passions that cannot last for long. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.35) | |
A reaction: The obvious example, for me, is the Labour Government in the UK, 1945-51. This is the kind of realism which progressive politicians must face up to. Unfortunately it is the logic of very ruthless revolutionaries. |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Individualist conservatives believe people should be free to do as they please so long as they do not harm others. ...Communal conservatives, by contrast, believe government should affirm moral and religious values. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.38) | |
A reaction: Nozick represents the first group (as does J.S.Mill, usually seen as epitomising liberalism). He says the first group like volunteer armies and oppose welfare; the second group favour conscription and conservative welfare. |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
Full Idea: In recent years liberalism has faltered because of its failure to argue for a vision of the common good. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.45) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's main theme. He derives his concept of the common good from the essential natures of persons and institutions. I greatly admire this. |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7) | |
A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths. |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. | |
From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences. |