16698
|
Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
|
|
Full Idea:
I grant that a successive being is composed out of non-beings, as is clear of a day, which is composed of non-entities. Some part of this day is past and some future, and yet this day is.
|
|
From:
Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III text 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
|
|
A reaction:
The dilemma of Aristotle over time infected the scholastic attempt to give an account of successive entities. A day is a wonderfully elusive entity for a metaphysician.
|
16690
|
Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
|
|
Full Idea:
This is the difference between permanent and successive things: that a permanent thing exists all at once, or at least can exist all at once, whereas it is incompatible with a successive thing to exist all at once.
|
|
From:
Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III txt 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
|
|
A reaction:
Permanent things sound like what are now called 'three-dimensional' objects, but scholastic 'entia successiva' are not the same as spacetime 'worms' or collections of temporal stages.
|
12126
|
People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
|
|
From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
|
|
A reaction:
I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
|
12125
|
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
|
|
Full Idea:
To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
|
|
From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
|
12118
|
Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
|
|
Full Idea:
I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
|
|
From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
|
|
A reaction:
I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
|
6011
|
There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
|
|
Full Idea:
Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
|
|
From:
report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
|
|
A reaction:
The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.
|