68 ideas
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: That knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
| A reaction: A surprising view, coming from the father of modern science, but essentially correct. Obviously metaphysics aspires to avoid multiplicity, but it is riddled not only with complexity in its researches, but massive uncertainties. |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
| A reaction: The father of modern science keeps a place for metaphysics, as the most abstract level above the physical sciences. I would say he is right. It leads to my own slogan: science is the servant of philosophy. |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: He cites the ancients for this view, with which he agrees. One could do worse than hang onto metaphysics as the study of necessities, but must then face the attacks of the Quineans - that knowledge of necessities is beyond us. |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Physic inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and metaphysic handleth the formal and final causes. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 12119. This divides up Aristotle's famous Four Causes (or Explanations), outlined in 'Physics' II.3. The concept of 'matter', and the nature of 'cause' seem to me to fall with the purview of metaphysics. Interesting, though. |
| 18194 | 'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Cohen's method of 'forcing' produces a new model of ZFC from an old model by appending a carefully chosen 'generic' set. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.4) |
| 18195 | A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: A possible axiom is the Large Cardinal Axiom, which asserts that there are more and more stages in the cumulative hierarchy. Infinity can be seen as the first of these stages, and Replacement pushes further in this direction. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.5) |
| 18191 | Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The axiom of infinity: that there are infinite sets is to claim that completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically. In its standard contemporary form, the axioms assert the existence of the set of all finite ordinals. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
| 18193 | The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: In the presence of other axioms, the Axiom of Foundation is equivalent to the claim that every set is a member of some Vα. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
| 18169 | Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility states that every propositional function is extensionally equivalent to some predicative proposition function. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) |
| 18168 | 'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: A 'propositional function' is generated when one of the terms of the proposition is replaced by a variable, as in 'x is wise' or 'Socrates'. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
| A reaction: This implies that you can only have a propositional function if it is derived from a complete proposition. Note that the variable can be in either subject or in predicate position. It extends Frege's account of a concept as 'x is F'. |
| 18171 | Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Both Cantor's real number (Cauchy sequences of rationals) and Dedekind's cuts involved regarding infinite items (sequences or sets) as completed and subject to further manipulation, bringing the completed infinite into mathematics unambiguously. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1 n39) | |
| A reaction: So it is the arrival of the real numbers which is the culprit for lumbering us with weird completed infinites, which can then be the subject of addition, multiplication and exponentiation. Maybe this was a silly mistake? |
| 18190 | Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The line of development that finally led to a coherent foundation for the calculus also led to the explicit introduction of completed infinities: each real number is identified with an infinite collection of rationals. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) | |
| A reaction: Effectively, completed infinities just are the real numbers. |
| 18172 | Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The stunning discovery that infinity comes in different degrees led to the theory of infinite cardinal numbers, the heart of contemporary set theory. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
| A reaction: It occurs to me that these huge cardinals only exist in set theory. If you took away that prop, they would vanish in a puff. |
| 18175 | For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: By the mid 1890s Cantor was aware that there could be no set of all sets, as its cardinal number would have to be the largest cardinal number, while his own theorem shows that for any cardinal there is a larger. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
| A reaction: There is always a larger cardinal because of the power set axiom. Some people regard that with suspicion. |
| 18196 | An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: An 'inaccessible' cardinal is one that cannot be reached by taking unions of small collections of smaller sets or by taking power sets. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.5) | |
| A reaction: They were introduced by Hausdorff in 1908. |
| 18187 | Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Even the fundamental theorems about limits could not [at first] be proved because the reals themselves were not well understood. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: This refers to the period of about 1850 (Weierstrass) to 1880 (Dedekind and Cantor). |
| 18182 | The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the extension of the concepts at all. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], §107) | |
| A reaction: He almost seems to equate the concept with its extension, but that seems to raise all sorts of questions, about indeterminate and fluctuating extensions. |
| 18177 | In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: In the ZFC cumulative hierarchy, Frege's candidates for numbers do not exist. For example, new three-element sets are formed at every stage, so there is no stage at which the set of all three-element sets could he formed. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: Ah. This is a very important fact indeed if you are trying to understand contemporary discussions in philosophy of mathematics. |
| 18164 | Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: To solve the Julius Caesar problem, Frege requires explicit definitions of the numbers, and he proposes his well-known solution: the number of Fs = the extension of the concept 'equinumerous with F' (based on one-one correspondence). | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
| A reaction: Why do there have to be Fs before there can be the corresponding number? If there were no F for 523, would that mean that '523' didn't exist (even if 522 and 524 did exist)? |
| 18184 | Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The set theory axioms developed in producing foundations for mathematics also have strong consequences for existing fields, and produce a theory that is immensely fruitful in its own right. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Second of Maddy's three benefits of set theory. This benefit is more questionable than the first, because the axioms may be invented because of their nice fruit, instead of their accurate account of foundations. |
| 18185 | Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The single unified area of set theory provides a court of final appeal for questions of mathematical existence and proof. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: Maddy's third benefit of set theory. 'Existence' means being modellable in sets, and 'proof' means being derivable from the axioms. The slightly ad hoc character of the axioms makes this a weaker defence. |
| 18183 | Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Set theoretic foundations bring all mathematical objects and structures into one arena, allowing relations and interactions between them to be clearly displayed and investigated. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: The first of three benefits of set theory which Maddy lists. The advantages of the one arena seem to be indisputable. |
| 18186 | Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The identification of geometric points with real numbers was among the first and most dramatic examples of the power of set theoretic foundations. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: Hence the clear definition of the reals by Dedekind and Cantor was the real trigger for launching set theory. |
| 18188 | The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The structure of a geometric line by rational points left gaps, which were inconsistent with a continuous line. Set theory provided an ordering that contained no gaps. These reals are constructed from rationals, which come from integers and naturals. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.2) | |
| A reaction: This completes the reduction of geometry to arithmetic and algebra, which was launch 250 years earlier by Descartes. |
| 18163 | Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Our much loved mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: inexorable deductive logic (the stuff of proof), and the set theoretic axioms. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I Intro) |
| 18207 | Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: It could turn out that all applications of continuum mathematics in natural sciences are actually instances of idealisation. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) |
| 18204 | Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Crudely, the scientist posits only those entities without which she cannot account for observations, while the set theorist posits as many entities as she can, short of inconsistency. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.5) |
| 18167 | We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Recent commentators have noted that Frege's versions of the basic propositions of arithmetic can be derived from Hume's Principle alone, that the fatal Law V is only needed to derive Hume's Principle itself from the definition of number. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) | |
| A reaction: Crispin Wright is the famous exponent of this modern view. Apparently Charles Parsons (1965) first floated the idea. |
| 18205 | The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: The case of atoms makes it clear that the indispensable appearance of an entity in our best scientific theory is not generally enough to convince scientists that it is real. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) | |
| A reaction: She refers to the period between Dalton and Einstein, when theories were full of atoms, but there was strong reluctance to actually say that they existed, until the direct evidence was incontrovertable. Nice point. |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5) | |
| A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way. |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.1) | |
| A reaction: After several hundred years, I doubt whether anyone can come up with a better account of scientific method than Bacon's. |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: The ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.5) | |
| A reaction: He gives as his example that the Copernican system and the Ptolemaic system both seem to satisfy all the facts. He wrote in 1605, just before Galileo's telescope. His point is regularly made in modern discussions. In this case, he was wrong! |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1) | |
| A reaction: I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail. |
| 18206 | Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: In science we treat the earth's surface as flat, we assume the ocean to be infinitely deep, we use continuous functions for what we know to be quantised, and we take liquids to be continuous despite atomic theory. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6) | |
| A reaction: If fussy people like scientists do this all the time, how much more so must the confused multitude be doing the same thing all day? |
| 20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc') | |
| A reaction: Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional? |
| 20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions? | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending') | |
| A reaction: Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers. |
| 20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: We need to distinguish between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality is what is best for each individual, on the assumption that everyone else will act the same way. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Hobbes') | |
| A reaction: Wolff is surmising what lies behind Hobbes's Laws of Nature (which concern collective rationality). The Prisoner's Dilemma is the dramatisation of this distinction. I would making the teaching of the distinction compulsory in schools. |
| 20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't. |
| 20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic') | |
| A reaction: I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient). |
| 20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: One thought is that consent to government is communicated via the ballot-box. In voting for the government we give it our consent. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic') | |
| A reaction: Hm. This may be a strong positive reason why some people refuse to vote. We shouldn't load voting with such heavy commitments. It's just 'given the current situation, who will be temporarily in charge'. |
| 20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The general will demands the policy which is equally in everyone's interests. Thus we can think of the general will as the general interest. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Rousseau') | |
| A reaction: That seems to assume that the people know what is in their interests. Rousseau's General Will mainly concerns who governs, and their mode of government, but not details of actual policy. |
| 20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them. |
| 20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative') | |
| A reaction: [The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent. |
| 20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum). | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
| A reaction: [my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net. |
| 20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism') | |
| A reaction: Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it? |
| 20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Many anarchists have accepted the need for the authority of experts within society | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism') | |
| A reaction: The status of experts may be the hottest topic in contemporary politics, given the contempt for experts shown by Trump, and by the Brexit campaign of 2016. It is a nice point that even anarchists can't duck the problem. |
| 20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: A utilitarian political philosophy would probably be a free market with a welfare state. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
| A reaction: This is roughly how Britain became, after the welfare state was added to Millian liberalism. What's missing from this formula is some degree of control of the free market, to permit welfare. |
| 20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: We are very unlikely to be able to find an instrumental defence of democracy which also builds the values of freedom and equality into a feasible system. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc') | |
| A reaction: I increasingly think that freedom is the most overrated political virtue (though it is certainly a virtue). Total freedom is ridiculous, but the aim of sacrificing many other social goods in order to maximise freedom also looks wrong. |
| 20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc') | |
| A reaction: I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect. |
| 20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Greeks assumed democracy was consistent with slavery, Rousseau that it was consistent with sexual inequality, and Wollstonecraft that it was consistent with disenfranchisement of the poor. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Freedom') | |
| A reaction: If you are allowed to restrict the franchise in some way, then a narrow oligarchy can qualify as a democracy, with half a dozen voters. |
| 20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: A democratic state has power only over the people who make up the electorate. Ruling over a subservient class, or territory, is claimed to be antithetical to the true ideals of democracy. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: Is making trade deals very favourable to yourself (i.e. good capitalism) antithetical to democracy? |
| 20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: To avoid mixed-motivation voting, we must choose between one model of people voting in accordance with their preferences, and another of voting for their estimate of the common good. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting') | |
| A reaction: Personally I always voted for the common good, and only slowly realised that most people were voting for their own interests. A rational society would at least bring this dichotomy into the open. Voting for self-interest isn't wicked. |
| 20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter. |
| 20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Most of us can accept losing from time to time, but sometimes an entrenched majority will win vote after vote, leaving the minority group permanently outvoted and ignored. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Protecting') | |
| A reaction: This is the key problem of the treatment of minorities in a democracy. Personally I have only once been on the winning side in voting for my MP, and he changed party a couple of years later. |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The price system is a way of signalling and transmitting information. The fact that the price of a good rises shows that the good is in short supply. And if prices rise in a sector because of increasing demand, then new producers rush in for the profits. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Free') | |
| A reaction: [Woff is discussing Hayek] Why do we have a shortage of decent housing in the UK? Centralised economies lack this direct way of discovering where their efforts should be directed. |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island. |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Critics say that the Difference Principle allows inequality of liberty ...and (more often) that liberty means we cannot impose any restriction on individual property holdings. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: The second objection is associated with Robert Nozick. The point is that you can implement the Difference Principle without restricting liberty. The standard right-wing objection of social welfare. |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments') | |
| A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share. |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
| A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them. |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory') | |
| A reaction: In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life. |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care). | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list. |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: The theory of basic natural rights is problematic, because although the theory is rigorous and principled, the disadvantage is that we are left with nothing more fundamental to say in defence of these rights. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: This is a nice point about anything which is treated as axiomatic - even Euclid's geometry. Presumably rights can only be justified by the needs of our shared human nature. |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have? | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
| A reaction: He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture? |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: A utilitarian justification of property rights says allowing people to appropriate property, trade in it, and leave it to their descendants will encourage them to make the most productive use of their resources. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Locke') | |
| A reaction: This obviously has a point, but equally justifies confiscation of land from people who are not making best use of it. In Sicily many landowners refused to allow the peasants to make any use at all of the land. |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending') | |
| A reaction: I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets. |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: Some laws have little grounding in morality. You may believe you have a moral obligation to stop at a red light at a deserted crossroads, but only because that is what the law tells you to do. | |
| From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Goal') | |
| A reaction: I would have thought such a law was wholly grounded in the morality of teamwork. It is the problem of rule utilitarianism, and also a problem about virtuous character. The puzzle is not the law, but the strict obedience to it. |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths. |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences. |