17 ideas
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: That knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
| A reaction: A surprising view, coming from the father of modern science, but essentially correct. Obviously metaphysics aspires to avoid multiplicity, but it is riddled not only with complexity in its researches, but massive uncertainties. |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6) | |
| A reaction: The father of modern science keeps a place for metaphysics, as the most abstract level above the physical sciences. I would say he is right. It leads to my own slogan: science is the servant of philosophy. |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: He cites the ancients for this view, with which he agrees. One could do worse than hang onto metaphysics as the study of necessities, but must then face the attacks of the Quineans - that knowledge of necessities is beyond us. |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Physic inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and metaphysic handleth the formal and final causes. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 12119. This divides up Aristotle's famous Four Causes (or Explanations), outlined in 'Physics' II.3. The concept of 'matter', and the nature of 'cause' seem to me to fall with the purview of metaphysics. Interesting, though. |
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does. | |
| From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6) |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another. | |
| From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5) |
| 22142 | In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Condemnation stipulated that all portions of the ancient intellectual heritage that placed non-logical limits on divine omnipotence were no longer to be tolerated. ...Philosophers now had to entertain the wildest ideas with all seriousness. | |
| From: report of Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
| A reaction: Boulter identifies this as 'the ultimate source of Hume's philosophical delirium'. Presumably the angels-on-a-pinhead stuff originated with this. It is crazy to think that the only limit on possible existence is logic. Can God make a planet of uranium? |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5) | |
| A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way. |
| 16716 | It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)] |
| Full Idea: Heresy 151: 'To have certainty regarding any conclusion, it must be founded on self-evident principles'. | |
| From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], 151), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.3 | |
| A reaction: The correct view is obviously to found certainty on faith and authority. It is one thing to be told that foundationalism is a poor theory, but another to be told it is a heresy, and thus a potential capital crime! |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.1) | |
| A reaction: After several hundred years, I doubt whether anyone can come up with a better account of scientific method than Bacon's. |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: The ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.5) | |
| A reaction: He gives as his example that the Copernican system and the Ptolemaic system both seem to satisfy all the facts. He wrote in 1605, just before Galileo's telescope. His point is regularly made in modern discussions. In this case, he was wrong! |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1) | |
| A reaction: I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail. |
| 1866 | It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)] |
| Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that with all the heavenly bodies coming back to the same point after a period of thirty-six thousand years, the same effects as now exist will reappear. | |
| From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §92) |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths. |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences. |
| 1865 | It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)] |
| Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that what is absolutely impossible according to nature cannot be brought about by God or another agent. | |
| From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §17) |
| 1864 | It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)] |
| Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life. | |
| From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §9) |