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All the ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'The Metaphysics within Physics' and 'Beauty: a very short introduction'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
     Full Idea: That knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6)
     A reaction: A surprising view, coming from the father of modern science, but essentially correct. Obviously metaphysics aspires to avoid multiplicity, but it is riddled not only with complexity in its researches, but massive uncertainties.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6)
     A reaction: The father of modern science keeps a place for metaphysics, as the most abstract level above the physical sciences. I would say he is right. It leads to my own slogan: science is the servant of philosophy.
The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: I suppose so. Physics only works at one level of description. Metaphysics often works with concepts which only emerge at a more general level than physics. There are also many metaphysical problems which are of no interest to most physicists.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: He cites the ancients for this view, with which he agrees. One could do worse than hang onto metaphysics as the study of necessities, but must then face the attacks of the Quineans - that knowledge of necessities is beyond us.
Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Physic inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and metaphysic handleth the formal and final causes.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12119. This divides up Aristotle's famous Four Causes (or Explanations), outlined in 'Physics' II.3. The concept of 'matter', and the nature of 'cause' seem to me to fall with the purview of metaphysics. Interesting, though.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3)
     A reaction: Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: If metaphysical possibility extends more widely than physical possibility, this may make metaphysics out to be nothing but the analysis of fantastical descriptions produced by philosophers.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue)
     A reaction: Maudlin wants metaphysics to be firmly constrained in its possibilities by what scientific undestanding permits, and he is right. Metaphysics must integrate into science, or wither away on the margins.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they?
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: If the universe has been profligate, then Ockham's Razor will lead us astray.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: That is, there may be a vast number of entities which exist beyond what seems to be 'necessary'.
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The Razor is good when it councils higher credence to explanations which posit a single cause to multiple events that occur in a striking pattern, over explanations involving coincidental multiple causes.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5)
     A reaction: This is in the context of Maudlin warning against embracing the Razor too strongly. Presumably inductive success suggests that the world supports this particular use of the Razor.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
     Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one?
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The Humean project is unjustified, in that both the laws of nature and the direction of time require no analysis, and is misconceived, in that the atoms it employs do not correspond to present physical ontology.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: I certainly find it strange, or excessively empirical, that Lewis thinks our account of reality should rest on 'qualities'. Maudlin's whole books is an implicit attack on David Lewis.
Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: At base it is not merely, as Lewis says, that everything else supervenes on the Mosaic; but rather that anything that exists at all is just a feature or element or generic property of the Mosaic.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6)
     A reaction: [Maudlin has just quoted Idea 16210] Correct about Lewis, but Lewis just has a normal view of supervenience. Only 'emergentists' would think the supervenience allowed anything more, and they are deeply misguided, and in need of help.
If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The Humean Mosaic appears to admit of no further explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock, …none of the further things can account for the structure of the Mosaic itself.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6)
     A reaction: A very nice point, reminiscent of Popper's objection to essentialism, that he thought it blocked further enquiry, when actually further enquiry was possible. Lewis and Hume seem too mesmerised by epistemology. They need best explanation.
The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The 'spinning disc' is not metaphysically possible. We have every reason to believe that there is no such thing as 'perfectly homogeneous matter'. The atomic theory of matter is as well established as any scientific theory is likely to be.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue)
     A reaction: This is a key case for Maudlin, and his contempt for metaphysics which is not scientifically informed. I agree with him. Extreme thought experiments are worth considering, but impossible ones are pointless.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of ontological commitment becomes a central element in a theory of ontology if one merely adds that a particular theory is, in fact, true
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Helpful. I don't think the truth of a theory entails the actual existence of every component mentioned in the theory, as some of them may be generalisations, abstractions, vague, or even convenient linking fictions.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Naïve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Fragility is not a fundamental physical property, in that two pieces of glass cannot be physically identical save for their fragility.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5)
     A reaction: Nice. The best idea I have found in Maudlin, so far! This gives a very nice test for picking out the fundamental physical and intrinsic properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: If one believes that fundamental physics is the place to look for the truths about universals (or tropes or natural sets), then one may find that physics is telling us there are no such things.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.2)
     A reaction: His prior discussion of quantum chromodynamics suggests, to me, merely that properties can be described in terms of vectors etc., and remains neutral on the ontology - but then I am blinded by science.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: On one line of thought, the question of whether universals exist seems to reduce to the question of the utility, or necessity, of using second-order rather than first-order logic.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Second-order logic quantifies over properties, where first-order logic just quantifies over objects. This is an extreme example of doing your metaphysics largely through logic. Not my approach.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: While logical impossibility is a species of metaphysical impossibility, logical possibility is not a species of metaphysical possibility. The logically impeccable description 'Cicero was not Tully' describes a metaphysically impossible situation.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue)
     A reaction: The context of this is Maudlin attack on daft notions of metaphysical possibility that are at variance with the limits set by science, but he is still conceding that there are types of metaphysical modality.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The purpose of the antecedent of a counterfactual is to provide instructions on how to pick a Cauchy surface (pick a moment in time) and how to generate an altered description of that moment. It is more of a command than an indicative sentence.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5)
     A reaction: Quite plausible, but the antecedent might contain no description. 'If things had gone differently, we wouldn't be in this mess'. The antecedent might be timeless. 'If pigs had wings, they still wouldn't fly'.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
     Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5)
     A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
     Full Idea: All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.1)
     A reaction: After several hundred years, I doubt whether anyone can come up with a better account of scientific method than Bacon's.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
     Full Idea: The ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.5)
     A reaction: He gives as his example that the Copernican system and the Ptolemaic system both seem to satisfy all the facts. He wrote in 1605, just before Galileo's telescope. His point is regularly made in modern discussions. In this case, he was wrong!
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Induction is always a leap beyond the known, but we are constantly assured by later experience that we have landed safely.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5)
     A reaction: Not philosophically very interesting, but a nice remark for capturing the lived aspect of inductive thought, as practised by the humblest of animals.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: A law ought to be capable of playing some role in explaining the phenomena that are governed by or are manifestations of it.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: I find this attitude bewildering. 'Why do electrons have spin?' 'Because they all do!' The word 'governed' is the clue. What on earth is a law, if it can 'govern' nature? What is its ontological status? Natures of things are basic, not 'laws'.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
     Full Idea: It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
     A reaction: I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Like the pleasure in friendship, the pleasure in beauty is curious: it aims to understand its object, and to value what it finds.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: At least he is trying to pin down the way in which aesthetic pleasure is phenomenologically different from other kinds of pleasure.
Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
     Full Idea: One aim of art is to present imaginary worlds, towards which we can adopt, as part of the integral aesthetic attitude, a posture of impartial concern.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5)
     A reaction: It connects to the pleasure of watching people when they don't know they are being watched (such as watching the street from a restaurant window). Scruton's suggestion makes art resemble examples in philosophy. Cf the Frege-Geach problem in ethics.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Maybe we can understand the 'beauty' of a building better if we describe it in another and less loaded way, as a form of fittingness or harmony.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: Almost everyone accepts the word 'beauty' for some things, such as a beautiful face, or goal, or steak. I remember a female interviewer writing that, reluctantly, the only appropriate word she could find for Nureyev's face was 'beautiful'.
Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Beauty speaks to us of human fulfilment: not of things that we want, but of things that we ought to want, because human nature requires them. Such, at least, is my belief.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7)
     A reaction: I'm not sure how this works with a beautiful natural landscape. And what should I see that I ought to desire after viewing a great Rembrandt self-portrait? That I don't want to end up looking as bleak as that? Hm. Lofty words.
Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Beauty is rationally founded; it challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 9)
     A reaction: This is the Kantian tradition, and I'm not finding it very persuasive. It seems to place the value of beauty in what we do with it afterwards, and he seems to make beauty a necessary stepping stone to virtue. I see beauty as more sui generis.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The experience of natural beauty is not a sense of 'how nice!' or 'how pleasant!' It contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be - a home in which our human powers and prospects find confirmation.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 2)
     A reaction: To call it a 'reassurance' and 'confirmation' sounds like theism, anthropomorphism, or the pathetic fallacy. That said, this is certainly a heart-warming idea, and hence must contain a grain of truth.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The Croce model is of an inarticulate inner state (an 'intuition') becoming articulate and conscious through artistic expression. The rival model is fitting thing together so as to create links which resonate in the audience's feelings.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5)
     A reaction: The first model tells you nothing about how the artist imagines the audience reacting. The second model tells you nothing about what matters personally to the artist. A good theory must do both!
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The condemnation of prostitution was not just puritan bigotry; it was a recognition of a profound truth, that you and your body are not two things but one, and by selling the body you harden your soul.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7)
     A reaction: No one, I imagine, who condones or even enthuses about prostitution would hope that their own daughter followed the profession, so there is something wrong with it. But must an enthusiastic and cheerful prostitute necessarily have a hard soul?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
     Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
     A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The evaluation of counterfactual claims is widely recognised as being influenced by context and interest.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5)
     A reaction: Such evaluation certainly seems to involve imagination, and so the pragmatics can creep in there. I don't quite see why it should be deeply contextual.
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: It seems unlikely the psychological process could mirror Lewis's semantics: people don't imagine a multiplicity of worlds and the pick out the most similar. Rather we construct representations of possible worlds from counterfactual descriptions.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5)
     A reaction: I approve of fitting such theories into a psychology, but this may be unfair to Lewis, who aims for a logical model, not an account of how we actually approach the problem.
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: A counterexample to the counterfactual approach is that perhaps the effect would have occurred despite the absence of the cause since another cause would have stepped in to bring it about.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5)
     A reaction: …Hence you cannot say 'if C had not occurred, E would definitely not have occurred'. You have to add 'ceteris paribus', which ruins the neatness of the theory.
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: When we think we know the cause of an event, we typically assent to the corresponding Hume counterfactual.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5)
     A reaction: This is the correct grounding of the counterfactual approach - not that we think counterfactuals are causation, but that knowledge of causation will map neatly onto a network of counterfactuals, thus providing a logic for the whole process.
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: If Kennedy had still been President in Dec 1963, he would not have been assassinated in Nov 1963, so the counterfactual goes both ways (where the cause seems to only go one way).
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5)
     A reaction: Maudlin says a lot of fine-tuning has sort of addressed these problems, but that counterfactual causation is basically wrong-headed anyway, and I incline to agree, though one must understand what the theory is (and is not) trying to do.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Laws are ontologically primitives at least in that two worlds could differ in their laws but not in any observable respect. ….[21] I take content of the laws to be expressed by equations.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: At least that spells out his view fairly dramatically, but I am baffled as to what he thinks a law could be. He is arguing against the Lewis regularity-axioms view, and the Armstrong universal-relations view. He ignores the essentialist view.
Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve from a given intial state.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6)
     A reaction: Maudlin takes both laws of nature and the passage of time to be primitive facts, and this is how they are connected. I think (this week) that I take time and causation to be primitive, but not laws.
Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: The laws of nature stand in no need of 'philosophical analysis'; they ought to be posited as ontological bedrock.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: This is Maudlin's most basic principle, and I don't agree with it. The notion that laws are more deeply embedded in reality than the physical stuff they control is a sort of 'law-mysticism' that needs to be challenged.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: 'All humans who live in houses with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law because the class referred to is not a natural kind.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.6)
     A reaction: Maudlin wants laws to be primitive, but he now needs a primitive notion of a natural kind to make it work. If kinds generate laws, you can ditch the laws, and build your theory on the kinds. He also says no death is explained by 'all humans are mortal'.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, I take it that if the world is extensive and variegated enough, then there must be laws.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5.2)
     A reaction: A nice point. If there is any sort of pattern discernible in the surface waves on the sea, then there must be a law to cover it, not matter how vague or complex.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
     Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: I believe that it is a fundamental, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal structure of the world that time passes.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4)
     A reaction: Worth quoting because it comes from a philosopher fully informed about, and heavily committed to, the physicist's approach to reality. One fears that physicists steeped in Einstein are all B-series Eternalists. Get a life!
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: It is necessary and, I suppose, a priori that if time passes at all it passes at one second per second. …Similarly, the fair exchange rate for a dollar must be a dollar.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.1)
     A reaction: [He is discussing Huw Price on time] This is a reply to the claim that if time passes it has to pass at some rate, and 'one second per second' is ridiculous. Not very convincing, even with the dollar analogy.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin]
     Full Idea: Given events ordered in a B series, one defines an infinitude of different A series that correspond to taking different events as 'now' or 'present'. McTaggart talks of 'the A series' when there is an infinitude of such.
     From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.3 n11)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather mathematical (and distorted) claim about the A series view. The A-series is one dynamic happening. Not an infinity of static times lines, each focused on a different 'now'.