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19743
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A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
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Full Idea:
Beliefs are partly constituted by features of the environment. ....a notebook plays for one person the same role that memory plays for another. ...The information is reliably there, available to consciousness, and to guide action, just as belief is.
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From:
A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §4)
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A reaction:
This is the modern externalist approach to beliefs (along with broad content and external cognition systems). Not quite what we used to mean by beliefs, but we'll get used to it. I believe Plato wrote what it said in his books. Is memory just a role?
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19741
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If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
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Full Idea:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process.
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From:
A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §2)
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A reaction:
In some sense they are obviously right that our cognitive activities spill out into books, calculators, record-keeping. It seems more like an invitation to shift the meaning of the word 'mind', than a proof that we have got it wrong.
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19742
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Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
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Full Idea:
Many identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in these cases. But not every cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process.
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From:
A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §3)
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A reaction:
This gives you two sorts of externalism about mind to consider. No, three, if you say there is extended conceptual content, then extended cognition processes, then extended consciousness. Depends what you mean by 'consciousness'.
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12126
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People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
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A reaction:
I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
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12125
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Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
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A reaction:
This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
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8412
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A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
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A reaction:
There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
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8413
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Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
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A reaction:
This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
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8411
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Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
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Full Idea:
I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
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From:
Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
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12118
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Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
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From:
Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
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A reaction:
I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.
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