Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' and 'The Unimportance of Identity'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12124 Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
     Full Idea: That knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6)
     A reaction: A surprising view, coming from the father of modern science, but essentially correct. Obviously metaphysics aspires to avoid multiplicity, but it is riddled not only with complexity in its researches, but massive uncertainties.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
12123 Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history, the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.6)
     A reaction: The father of modern science keeps a place for metaphysics, as the most abstract level above the physical sciences. I would say he is right. It leads to my own slogan: science is the servant of philosophy.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12119 Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: He cites the ancients for this view, with which he agrees. One could do worse than hang onto metaphysics as the study of necessities, but must then face the attacks of the Quineans - that knowledge of necessities is beyond us.
12120 Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Physic inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and metaphysic handleth the formal and final causes.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12119. This divides up Aristotle's famous Four Causes (or Explanations), outlined in 'Physics' II.3. The concept of 'matter', and the nature of 'cause' seem to me to fall with the purview of metaphysics. Interesting, though.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
     Full Idea: I believe it is worth considering imaginary cases (such as Teletransportation), as we can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
     A reaction: The trouble is that we might say that IF I were suddenly turned into a pig, then I would come to believe in dualism, but that will not and cannot happen, because dualism is false. It seems essential to accept the natural possibility of the case.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.').
     From: report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
12121 We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
     Full Idea: They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.5)
     A reaction: Just the sort of pithy remark for which Bacon is famous. It is an obvious point, but a nice corrective to anyone who wants to apply empirical principles in a rather gormless way.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
12117 Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
     Full Idea: All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.1)
     A reaction: After several hundred years, I doubt whether anyone can come up with a better account of scientific method than Bacon's.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
12127 Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
     Full Idea: The ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.5)
     A reaction: He gives as his example that the Copernican system and the Ptolemaic system both seem to satisfy all the facts. He wrote in 1605, just before Galileo's telescope. His point is regularly made in modern discussions. In this case, he was wrong!
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
20643 Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell]
     Full Idea: Consilience is the jumping together of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation.
     From: William Whewell (The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences [1840]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence Intro 'United'
     A reaction: Apparently this is the first use of the word, which was popularised by E.O. Wilson in recent times. If, as I do, you dream of a final theory, in philosophy as well as in science, then you have to be a fan of consilience.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
12126 People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
     Full Idea: It is the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VIII.1)
     A reaction: I have to plead guilty to this myself. He may have pinpointed the key motivation behind philosophy. We all want to know things, as Aristotle said, but some of us want the broad brush, and others want the fine detail.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
     Full Idea: When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be (as in an 'identity crisis'). But when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
     A reaction: I think it is important to note that the philosophical problem breaks down into two areas: whether I have numerical identity with myself over time, and whether other people have it. It may be that two different sets of criteria will emerge.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
     Full Idea: If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314)
     A reaction: I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings.
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
     Full Idea: We should revise our view about identity over time: what matters isn't that there will be someone alive who will be me; it is rather that there should be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.316)
     A reaction: Parfit and Locke seem to agree on this, and it is no accident that they both like 'science fiction' examples. Apparently Parfit wouldn't bat an eyelid if someone threatened to cut his corpus callosum. I rate it as a catastrophe for my current existence.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
     Full Idea: If I am largely paralysed, and my twin brother is dying of brain disease, then if the operation to graft my head onto his body is offered, I should accept the operation, and it is irrelevant whether this person would be me.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.308)
     A reaction: Parfit notes that the brain is a particularly significant part of the process. The fact that I might cheerfully accept this offer without philosophical worries doesn't get rid of the question 'who is this person?' Who should they remain married to?
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
     Full Idea: If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310)
     A reaction: It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
     Full Idea: It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I have the same audio system, and also whether I exist if half of my body were simultaneously replaced.
     From: Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.302)
     A reaction: It is impossible to deny this, if the part replaced is not the brain. My doubt about Parfit's thesis is that while I may not care whether some modified thing is still me, my lawyers and the police might be very concerned.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
12125 Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
     Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
     A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12118 Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
     Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
     From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
     A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.