Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Letters to Hugo Boxel' and 'Bayesianism'

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4 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letters to Hugo Boxel [1674], 1674?)
     A reaction: Spinoza offers this nicely expressed point to support his view that beauty is strictly relative to observers, but I am unconvinced. If the outline of the hand is its key aesthetic feature, the viewer through the microscope cannot see it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.