Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'How free does the will need to be?' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
     Full Idea: Researches in the foundations of mathematics have made it clear that all of (interpreted) mathematics can be got down to logic and set theory, and the objects needed for mathematics can be got down to the category of classes (and classes of classes..).
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
     A reaction: This I take to be a retreat from pure logicism, presumably influenced by Gödel. So can set theory be reduced to logic? Crispin Wright is the one the study.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
     Full Idea: The category of objects embraces indiscriminately what would anciently have been distinguished as substances and as modes or states of substances.
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §6)
     A reaction: This nicely captures Quine's elimination of properties, by presenting them as inseparable from their objects/substances. Armstrong calls this 'Ostrich Nominalism' (for refusing to address the universals problem) but Quineans are unshaken.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
     Full Idea: A physical ontology has a place for states of mind. An inspiration or a hallucination can, like the fit of ague, be identified with its host for the duration. It leaves our mentalistic idioms fairly intact, but reconciles them with a physical ontology.
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
     A reaction: Quine is employing the same strategy that he uses for substances and properties (Idea 8461): take the predication as basic, rather than reifying the thing being predicated. The ague analogy suggests that Quine is an incipient functionalist.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20168 Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: One of the most obvious facts about blame is that in many cases it is effective only if the recipient thinks that it is justified.
     From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
     A reaction: The point of the blame might not be reform of the agent, but a public justification for punishment as deterrence, in which case who cares what the agent thinks? Is blame attribution of causes, or reasons to punish?
20167 Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Blame rests, in part, on a fiction; the idea that ethical reasons, in particular the special kind of ethical reasons that are obligations, must, really, be available to the blamed agent.
     From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
     A reaction: In blaming someone, you may be telling them that they should know their obligations, rather than assuming that they do know them. How else can we give children a moral education?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16764 The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.