Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'The Theory of Knowledge' and 'Parthood and Identity across Time'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

23476	Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
	Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
	A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein.

23477	We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
	Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
	A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects.

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth

18273	Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
	Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What'

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts

22315	There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
	Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg'
	A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello).

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

13267	Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Thomson famously objects that the doctrine of temporal parts is 'a crazy metaphysic - obviously false', since it entails that material objects are constantly being generated ex nihilo (or, at least, the stuff of which they are composed is).
	From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (Parthood and Identity across Time [1983], p.210) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 2.2
	A reaction: The related objections are to ask what the temporal 'width' of a part is, and whether the joins are visible.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

16764	The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
	Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
	From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
	A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.