28 ideas
2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Carneades said the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetition. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.09.29 | |
A reaction: Nice, but I would want to emphasise the distinction between truth and its criterion. Admittedly we would have no truth without a good criterion, but the truth itself should be held in higher esteem than our miserable human means of grasping it. |
21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
Full Idea: We call those past events true of which at an earlier time this proposition was true: 'They are present now'; similarly, we shall call those future events true of which at some future time this proposition will be true: 'They are present now'. | |
From: Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
A reaction: This is a very nice way of paraphrasing statements about the necessity of true future contingent events. It still relies, of course, on the veracity of a tensed assertion |
21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Just as we speak of past things as true that possessed true actuality at some former time, so we speak of future things as true that will possess true actuality at some following time. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.27 | |
A reaction: This ducks the Aristotle problem of where it is true NOW when you say there will be a sea-fight tomorrow, and it turns out to be true. Carneades seems to be affirming a truth when it does not yet have a truthmaker. |
21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
Full Idea: The Liberal Nationalist argument is that if we want to have welfare states or vibrant democracies, then we will need the kind of solidarity that shared nationality fosters. …Unwelcome democratic decisions are more acceptable when made by co-nationals. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: We've just experienced this with Brexit (2016), where perfectly sensible decisions were being made in Brussels, but the popular press whipped up hostility because the British had a restricted role in the decisions. Prefer our idiots to their sages. |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Carneades denied the principle of the transitivity of identity. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE], fr 41-42) by Roderick Chisholm - Person and Object 3.1 | |
A reaction: Chisholm calls this 'extreme', but I assume Carneades wouldn't deny the principle in mathematics. I'm guessing that he just means that nothing ever stays quite the same. |
21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
Full Idea: From 'E will take place is true' it follows that E must take place. But 'must' here is logical not causal necessity. It is a considerable achievement of Carneades to have distinguished these two senses of necessity. | |
From: comment on Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 3 | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think 'necessity' is univocal, and does not have two senses. What Carneades has nicely done is distinguish the two different grounds for the necessities. |
21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Voluntary motion possesses the intrinsic property of being in our power and of obeying us, and its obedience is not uncaused, for its nature is itself the cause of this. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 11.25 | |
A reaction: To say that actions arise from our 'intrinsic power' is not much of an explanation, but it is still informative - that you should study the intrinsic powers of humans if you want to explain it. |
21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Now something is in our power; but if everything happens as a result of destiny all things happen as a result of antecedent causes; therefore what happens does not happen as a result of destiny. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.31 | |
A reaction: This invites the question of whether some things really are 'in our power'. Carneades (as expressed by Cicero) takes that for granted. Our 'power' may be antecedent causes in disguise. |
21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Carneades used to say that not even Apollo could tell any future events except those whose causes were so held together that they must necessarily happen. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 14.32 | |
A reaction: Carneades is opposing the usual belief in divination, where even priests can foretell contingent future events to some extent. Careneades, of course, was defending free will. |
21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Most uitlitarians do not distinguish between acts and omissions, and see no morally relevant difference between walking past a drowning child and pushing a child into a pond. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 09) | |
A reaction: He cites Peter Singer as an instance. The notorious Trolley Problem focuses on such issues. Michael Sandel in 'Justice' is good on that. If motive and intention matter, the two cases could be very different. Too timid to push, but also too timid to help? |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Carneades argued forcefully that in the event of a shipwreck, the wise man would be prepared to seize the only plank capable of bearing him to shore, even if that meant pushing another person off it. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
A reaction: [source for this?] This thought seems to have provoked great discussion in the sixteenth century (mostly sympathetic). I can't help thinking the right answer depends on assessing your rival. Die for a hero, drown a nasty fool. |
21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
Full Idea: Groups can be oppressed in seven different ways: by violence, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural domination, exploitation, stigmatisation, neglect of interests, and lack of egalitarian ethos. | |
From: report of Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 08) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [my summary of Shorten's summary] These headings seem to overlap somewhat. It strengthens my growing view that if one builds a political philosophy around the supreme virtue of respect, then all of these modes of oppression are undermined. |
21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
Full Idea: 'Constitutional patriots' favour a 'post-national' form of political identity in which members share common political values, but not necessarily a common national identity. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Not sure if you can keep political values distinct from community values. In theory it is an approach designed for cultural pluralism. But if the political values are liberal that implies cultural freedoms for (e.g.) women. |
21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Competitive democrats believe that democracy is simply a method for selecting political leaders …Participatory democrats associate the democratic ideal with living in a participatory society …Deliberative democrats identify public reasoning as key. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: Personally I would favour public discussion, but that is the last thing leaders want, especially if they are not very knowledgeable or clever. |
21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Some theorist think that democracy is intrinsically valuable, but others believe that it is valuable because it delivers good outcomes. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 05) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how the majority having a dictatorship over the minority could be an intrinsic good. If we start with respect as the supreme social virtue, then participation and public discussion might be intrinsic goods. |
21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Mandate Representation says they are delegates who should not deviate from instructions; Trustee says they use their discretion and judgement; Descriptive says they share group characteristics. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04) | |
A reaction: [compressed] There is also being a representative because you have an audience (such as celebrity campains). The second type was famously defended by Edmund Burke. The third implies being the same colour, or gender, or religion. |
21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
Full Idea: The general theory of 'mirror representation' says that a representative body or institution should be a statistically accurate sample of the wider society it represents. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04) | |
A reaction: How fine-grained should this be in accuracy. Should every small minority have at least one rep? Can't reps be trusted to speak for people a bit different from themselves? Maybe not! He quotes Mirabeau in support of this idea. |
21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
Full Idea: An important tension in Mandate Representation seemingly requires politicians to both uphold their electoral promises and promote the interests of their constituents. These can conflict, with changed circumstances or information. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04 Box 4.1) | |
A reaction: So be careful what you promise, and don't take on a party loyalty that conflicts with your constituents' interests. Easy. |
21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
Full Idea: The liberal theory of political community contains a moral thesis which says that members should share a moral concern for one another as free and equal citizens. …Citizens are not required to have much else in common with one another. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: A key thought. Liberal hearts swell with pride at the first half, but anti-liberals are interested in the second bit. If my neighbour lives in miserable poverty, should I only ask whether they are 'equal and free'? Respect everything! |
21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
Full Idea: On a radical reading of Foucault, the very ideal of a rational, autonomous moral agent that lies at the heart of liberal governmentality is nothing more than the effect of a particular form of domination. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 06) | |
A reaction: [Apologies for the word 'governmentality'; I'm just the messenger] Presumably Foucault's philosophy is also the result of domination, so it is hard to know where to start. The status of rationality is the central issue. |
21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
Full Idea: A liberal society treats people as equals by equipping them with the same set of rights, and it respects their freedom by allowing them to choose their own freely chosen ends. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: Equality of rights is fairly standard in any modern society (at least in principle). Freedom of ends is trickier. You can dismiss someone sleeping in the gutter as living a life that resulted from their choices. How many people have clear goals in life? |
21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
Full Idea: 'Liberal nationalists' say liberalism is compatible with promoting nationality, by teaching national history and literature and supporting its language. Compatriot priority adds that the needs of compatriots can override those of foreigners. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: [compressed] As a teacher of literature I always preferred to teach the literature of my own country, but without considering the reasons for it. But it was a combination of pride in my people's achievements, and a desire to strengthen social bonds. |
21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Communitarians say that liberalism could only justified by appealing to controversial assumptions that are not universally shared, such as the significance of choosing one's own plan of life. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: In the past, at least, huge numbers of people have been perfectly happy living a life designed for them by their parents. It is not much consolation for a disastrous life that at least you planned it yourself. Liberal values are not self-evident. |
21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
Full Idea: Communitarians say that liberalism treats individuals as strangers to one another, and underestimates the extent to which individuals are 'constituted' by their societies and social memberships. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
A reaction: On the other hand you can have 'too much community'. Surely the test for any political system is the quality of lives led by individual citizens? There can never be a wonderful community full of miserable citizens. |
21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
Full Idea: While Liberal Nationalists push liberalism in a particularist and communitarian direction, Constitutional Patriots emphasise its universalistic and cosmopolitan aspects. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
A reaction: So many attractive qualities to choose from! A tolerant community ought to be cosmopolitan. Being universalistic should not entail a neglect of the particular. Etc. |
21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |
Full Idea: The same people often changed laws according to circumstances; there is no natural law. There is no such thing as justice or, if there is, it is the height of folly, since a man injures himself in taking thought for the advantage of others. | |
From: report of Carneades (fragments/reports [c.174 BCE]) by Lactantius - Institutiones Divinae 5.16.4 | |
A reaction: [An argument used by Carneades on his notorious 156BCE visit to Rome, where he argued both for and against justice] This is probably the right wing view of justice. Why give other people what they want, if it is at our expense? |
21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
Full Idea: One historically influential solution to the discord unleashed by the fact of religious diversity was to institutionalise the principle of toleration by separating church and state. | |
From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 03) | |
A reaction: In 2018 Britain we still have an established religion (Anglicanism - Episcopalianism in the US), but toleration has arrived with the decline of religious belief. It must still be tough for Muslims, Jews etc to see a different religion as the official one. |