Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Critical Common-Sensism' and 'Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Logicians have too much neglected the study of vagueness, not suspecting the important part it plays in mathematical thought. It is the antithetical analogue of generality.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The 'vague' might be defined as that to which the principle of contradiction does not apply. For it is false neither that an animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female. No communication between persons can be entirely non-vague.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Critical Common-Sensism [1905], I)
     A reaction: Note that he makes vagueness largely a matter of the way we talk, which is David Lewis's approach, and looks right to me.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: When one of two non-contemporaneous elements contains the grounds for the other, the former is regarded as the antecedent, and the latter as the consequence
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics [1715], p.201)
     A reaction: Bardon cites this passage of Leibniz as the origin of the idea that time's arrow is explained by the direction of causation. Bardon prefers it to the psychological and entropy accounts.