Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'The Facts of Causation' and 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

10365	We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

19729	'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
	Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19728	Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
	Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

16764	The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
	Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
	From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
	A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

4785	Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
	A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation

8408	Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
	A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.