24 ideas
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The basic sources of knowledge and justification are perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int) |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of perceptions says that to perceive an object is to have a sense-datum caused by that object; it is not enough for the world to be the way we perceive it; the world must cause the perception. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int) | |
| A reaction: All causal theories seem dubious to me; what causes something is not the same was what it means, or refers to, or what justifies it. The hallmark of successful perception is truth. I would perceive a tree if God planted the perception in me. |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: You can first come to know by remembering, as in learning how many windows there were in your childhood home by imagining a tour. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int) |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between a person being justified in holding a belief, and the belief itself being justified. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.II Int) | |
| A reaction: This is the crucial and elementary distinction which even the most sophisticated of epistemologists keep losing sight of. Epistemology is about persons. All true beliefs are justified - by the facts! |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The driving force behind foundationalism has always been the threat of an infinite regress. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int) | |
| A reaction: You could just live with the regress (Peter Klein), or say that the regress fades away, or that it is cut off by social epistemological convention, or the regress circles round and rejoins. |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: If sense experiences are non-epistemic they may be infallible, but they are unsuitable for providing the foundations for other beliefs. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int) | |
| A reaction: If we experience flashing lights in the retina, or an afterimage, we don't think we are seeing objects, so why is normal perception different? Ans: because it is supported by judgement. |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The concept of justification is absolutely central to epistemology; but this concept is normative (i.e. it lays down norms), so epistemology can't be reduced to factual cognitive psychology. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int) | |
| A reaction: A simple rejection of the 'epistemology naturalised' idea. Best to start with slugs rather than people. You can confuse a slug, so it has truth or falsehood, but what is slug normativity? This is an interesting discussion point, not an argument. |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: In modern epistemology the three strategies to rebut the sceptic are 1) epistemological externalism, 2) the 'relevant alternative account of knowledge' (that scepticism is too extreme to be relevant), and 3) semantic externalism. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.IV Int) |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: The new riddle of induction ('grue') seems to demonstrate that sound inductive inferences are arbitrary because they depend on the actual language people use to formulate predictions. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int) |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| Full Idea: Semantic externalism ties our mental content down to our actual environment so there is no possibility of massive error. | |
| From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.V Int) | |
| A reaction: This sounds more prescriptive than descriptive. People do make massive errors in their concepts. Maybe educated people are more externalist (respectful of experts) than uneducated people? |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
| From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
| 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
| Full Idea: While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.I.222) | |
| A reaction: Even criminals can be patriotic. Why do people dump rubbish in beauty spots? |
| 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
| Full Idea: What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual? | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree, even if occasional cases of extreme altruism can occur. |
| 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.I.217) | |
| A reaction: If pleasure and utility can be intrinsically valuable, why can't virtue be as well? |
| 3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.163) | |
| A reaction: A sense of fairness precedes the building of a society, rather than arising out of it. |
| 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Suppose nature has bestowed on humans such abundance of external conveniences that every individual is fully provided with whatever his appetites can want. …Justice, in that case, would be totally useless, and have no place in the catalogue of virtues. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.III.145) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems to emphasise possessions and satisfaction of appetites, but presumably it would also need total security from other humans, which nature might struggle to provide. No sharing in this imagined world. |
| 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.136) | |
| A reaction: A surprising view from someone who thinks morals are basically sentiment. |
| 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Inference and conclusions of the understanding have no hold of the affections nor set in motion the active powers of man. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], I.136) | |
| A reaction: I disagree. This is a typical empiricist separation of ideas from experience, of inner from outer, of analytic from synthetic. |
| 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The sole trouble which virtue demands is that of just calculation, and a steady preference for the greater happiness. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: Hume was the parent of utilitarianism. Can one person exhibit virtue on a desert island? |
| 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement? | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], V.II.183) | |
| A reaction: He is right that we empathise with the pain of others, and this is presumably one of the bases of morality. Animals lack sympathy for other animals. |
| 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
| Full Idea: It is wisely ordained by nature, that private connexions should commonly prevail over universal views and considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissipated and lost, for want of a proper limited object. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], V.II.186n) | |
| A reaction: A very good objection to the excessively altruistic demands of utilitarianism. |
| 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The safety of the people is the supreme law. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.157) | |
| A reaction: No political system ever seems able to disagree with this. |
| 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Truths which are pernicious to society, if any such there be, will yield to errors which are salutary and advantageous. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228) | |
| A reaction: Hume probably meant religion. Two centuries later we have a greater appetite for uncomfortable truth. |
| 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality. | |
| From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], III.II.155) | |
| A reaction: This might not be so if there is a totalitarian restriction of economic freedom. |