Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'How to Define Theoretical Terms' and 'Letters to Fardella'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro)
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Fardella [1690], A6.4.1670), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: In all of Leibniz's many gropings towards what is at the heart of a unified object, I pounce on the phrase "the first active faculty" as the one that suits me. I take that to be a 'power'. It has two characteristics - it is active, and it is basic.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III)
     A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V)
A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II)
     A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism]
There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro)
     A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days.
It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III)
     A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.