Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Statements about Universals' and 'Two Problems for Essentialism'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals

8499	Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
	Full Idea: It is not always possible for nominalists to translate all statements putatively about universals as statements about particulars. It is not possible for 'red is a colour' and 'red resembles pink more than blue'
	From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.89)
	A reaction: His second example strikes me as the biggest challenge facing nominalism. I wish they wouldn't use secondary qualities as examples. I am unconvinced that the existence of universals will improve the explanation. It's a mystery.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

8500	Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
	Full Idea: Some red things resemble some blue things more than some pink things because of factors other than colour. Nominalists must offer 'anything red colour-resembles anything pink', but that may contain a universal in disguise.
	From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.90)
	A reaction: Hume and Quine are probably right that we spot resemblances instantly, and only articulate the respect of the resemblance at a later stage.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

16764	The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
	Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
	From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
	A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

5492	How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: In Newtonian physics the distance between two objects determines the attractive forces between them, but then the objects will have to be sensitive to the distance, in order to 'know' what forces to generate; but distance isn't a causal power.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Two Problems for Essentialism [2001], p.170)
	A reaction: Ellis replies that he is not troubled, because he believes in essential properties which are separate from their causal roles. Indeed, how else could you explain their causal roles? Still, distance must be mentioned when explaining gravity.