Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Philosophy of Revelation' and 'works'

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3 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine]
     Full Idea: Throughout Schelling's work we find the affirmation of absolute freedom or of the absolute as freedom.
     From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Philosophy of Revelation [1843], Vol.13 p.359) by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83
     A reaction: Of all of the German idealists, Schelling may be the closest to modern existentialism.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Turing showed that logical rules can be specified computationally and mechanically [Turing, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Turing showed that any formal process can be specified computationally, and captured by a Turing Machine. Hence logical rules (and arithmetic) could be obeyed not by someone representing and following them, but by causal organisation of the brain.
     From: report of Alan Turing (works [1935]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.2
     A reaction: It is questionable whether logic is an entirely formal process, if it involves truth. You would need an entirely formal notion of truth for that. But a brain can do whatever a flow diagram can do.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.