5 ideas
22072 | Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine] |
Full Idea: Throughout Schelling's work we find the affirmation of absolute freedom or of the absolute as freedom. | |
From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Philosophy of Revelation [1843], Vol.13 p.359) by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83 | |
A reaction: Of all of the German idealists, Schelling may be the closest to modern existentialism. |
10645 | We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: We have three different ways in which we arrive at concepts or universals: there is a clarification, where we have a ready-made concept and define it; we have a combination (where a definition creates a concept); and an experience can lead to a habit. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.190) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] He cites Russell as calling the third one a 'condensed induction'. There seems to an intellectualist and non-intellectualist strand in the abstractionist tradition. |
10644 | A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: A 'felt familiarity' with universals seems to be more primitive than explicit abstraction. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.188) | |
A reaction: This I take to be part of the 'given' of the abstractionist view, which is quite well described in the first instance by Aristotle. Price says that it is 'pre-verbal'. |
10646 | Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH] |
Full Idea: Whether you call it inductive or not, our understanding of such a word as 'dog' or 'house' does arise from a repeated experience of concomitances. | |
From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.191) | |
A reaction: Philosophers don't use phrases like that last one any more. How else could we form the concept of 'dog' - if we are actually allowed to discuss the question of concept-formation, instead of just the logic of concepts. |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |