16703
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God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
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Full Idea:
Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
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From:
Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
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A reaction:
This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
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16699
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Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
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Full Idea:
For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
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From:
Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
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A reaction:
A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.
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20417
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Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
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Full Idea:
Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood).
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From:
Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1)
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A reaction:
I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that.
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16764
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The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
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Full Idea:
Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
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From:
Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
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A reaction:
A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
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