29 ideas
9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Science deals with the phenomena, ..but it is metaphysics, and only metaphysics, that tells us what ultimately exists. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.2) |
9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
Full Idea: There are many forms of reasoning - extrapolation, interpolation, and other arguments from analogy - that are useful but deductively invalid. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 04.4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Molnar for this] |
9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
Full Idea: For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.6) |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The view of properties I find most attractive is one in which they are natural clusters of, and exhausted by, powers (plus other connections to other properties). | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.6) |
9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
Full Idea: A 'porridge' nominalist denies natural kinds, and thinks there are no objective divisions in reality, so concepts or words can be used by a community to divide the world up in any way that suits their purposes. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.3) |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If a cluster of ten powers exhausts property F, and property G differs in respect of just one power, this might explain why properties can resemble other properties and in different degrees. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.6) | |
A reaction: I love this. The most intractable problem about properties and universals is that of abstract reference - pink resembles red more than pink resembles green. If colours are clusters of powers, red and pink share nine out of ten of them. |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Essentialists fail to show how we ascend from being a property universally possessed, by all kind members, to the status of being an essential property. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This is precisely where my proposal comes in - the essential properties, as opposed to the accidentaly universals, are those which explain the nature and behaviour of each kind of thing (and each individual thing). |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
Full Idea: One might have a singularist view of causation in which a cause necessitates its effect, but they need not be subsumed under a law, ..and there are identities which are metaphysically necessary without being laws of nature. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 04.5) |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If we take causal language at face value and give up reducing causal concepts to non-causal, non-modal concepts, we can give up the counterfactual dependence account. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.5) |
9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If laws do not give the world necessity, what does? I argue the positive case for it being properties, and properties alone, that do the job (so we might call them 'modal properties'). | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.1) |
9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The contenders for the logical form of a law statement are 1) a universally quantified conditional, 2) a second-order relation between first-order universals, 3) a functional equivalence, and 4) a dispositional characteristic of a natural kind. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 10.3) |
9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
Full Idea: While it might be true that for all x, if Ax then Bx, would we really want to count it as a genuine regularity in nature if only five things were A (and all five were also B)? | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.3) |
9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
Full Idea: It seems that the fewer the instances, the more likely it is that there be a regularity, ..and if there are no cases at all, and no S is P, that is a regularity. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.3) | |
A reaction: [He attributes the second point to Molnar] |
9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Pure regularities are not nearly as common as might have been thought, and are usually only to be found in simplified or idealized conditions. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 05.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Nancy Cartwright 1999 for this view] |
9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
Full Idea: A regularity-law does not explain its instances, because such laws play no role in determining or governing their instances. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 09.7) | |
A reaction: Good. It has always seemed to me entirely vacuous to explain an event simply by saying that it falls under some law. |
9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If the world really does have its own nomological structure, that a systematization merely describes, why are the laws not to be equated with the nomological structure itself, rather than with the system that describes it? | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.4) |
9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The best systems theory (of Mill-Ramsey-Lewis) says that laws are not seen as regularities but, rather, as those things from which regularities - or rather, the whole world history including the regularities and everything else - can be derived. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 03.4) | |
A reaction: Put this way, the theory invites questions about ontology. Regularities are just patterns in physical reality, but axioms are propositions. So are they just features of human thought, or do these axioms actuallyr reside in reality. Too weak or too strong. |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If there are laws that are instantiated in no particulars, then this would seem to favour the theory that laws connect universals rather than particulars. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 06.4) | |
A reaction: There is a dispute here between the Platonic view of uninstantiated universals (Tooley) and the Aristotelian instantiated view (Armstrong). Mumford and I prefer the dispositional account. |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The core of the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view of the late 70s is that we have a law of nature when we have a relation of natural necessitation between universals. ..The innovation was that laws are about properties, and only indirectly about particulars. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 06.2) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if we should then be able to know the laws of nature a priori, since that was Russell's 1912 definition of a priori knowledge. |
9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
Full Idea: If dispositional essentialism is granted, then there is a law of nature wherever there is an essential property of a natural kind; laws are just the havings of essential properties by natural kinds. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.2) | |
A reaction: [He is expounding Ellis's view] |
9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Where properties are possessed by all kind members, we must distinguish the accidental from essential ones by considering all actual and possible kind members. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This is why we must treat possibilities as features of the actual world. |
9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The Central Dilemma about laws of nature is that, if they have some governing role, then they must be internal or external to the things governed, and it is hard to give a plausible account of either view. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 09.2) | |
A reaction: This dilemma is the basis of Mumford's total rejection of 'laws of nature'. I think I agree. |
9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Laws are a solution to a problem that was misconceived. Only if you think that the world would be otherwise inactive or inanimate, do you have the need to add laws to your ontology. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.5) | |
A reaction: This is a bold and extreme view - and I agree with it. I consider laws to be quite a useful concept when discussing nature, but they are not part of the ontology, and they don't do any work. They are metaphysically hopeless. |
9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
Full Idea: Laws do not appear in Aristotle's metaphysics, and it wasn't until Descartes and Newton that laws entered the intellectual mainstream. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 5470. |