15063
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Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro)
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A reaction:
Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal?
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15072
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Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08)
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A reaction:
For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'.
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15071
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Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07)
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A reaction:
Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it.
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15075
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Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
It is natural to suggest that to be a man is to have certain kind of temporal-modal profile. ...but it seems natural that being a man accounts for the profile, ...so one should not appeal to an object's modal features in stating what the object is.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as a correct and very helpful point, as I am tempted to think that the modal dispositions of a thing are intrinsic to its identity. If we accept 'powers', must they be modal in character? Fine backs a sortal approach. That's ideology.
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15073
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Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The existential identity of an object with itself needs analysis into two components, one the neutral identity of the object with itself, and the other its existence. The existence of the object appears to be merely a gratuitous addition to its identity.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08)
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A reaction:
This is at least a step towards clarification of the notion, which might be seen as just a way of asserting that something 'has an identity'. Fine likes the modern Fregean way of expressing this, as an equality relation.
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15069
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Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
An alternative conception of a possible world says it is constituted, not by the totality of facts, or of how things might be, but by the totality of circumstances, or how things might turn out.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02)
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A reaction:
The general idea is to make a possible world more limited than in Idea 15068. It only contains properties arising from 'engagement with the world', and won't include timeless sentences. It is a bunch of possibilities, not of actualities?
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16764
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The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
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Full Idea:
Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
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From:
Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
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A reaction:
A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
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21798
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To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would have anything to give.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 152), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Faith'
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A reaction:
Matthew 5:8, 19:21. Beautifully clear. [I always believed that I had thought of this idea - but not so]. If the logic is that it is better to be poor than to be rich, then the implication is that all excess wealth should be thrown into the sea.
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21797
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Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
The immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. ...As pure knowing or as thinking, Spirit has the universal for its object - this is eternity.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 208), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Death'
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A reaction:
An unusual view of immortality, which challenges orthodoxy. The idea seems to be that 'pure knowing' is a grasping of the pure reason which embodies nature, which in turn is the nature of God. You enter eternity, rather than reside in it?
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