Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Pacidius Philalethi dialogue' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

11257	The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
	Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
	From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
	A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth

11235	'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
	Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
	A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

11277	Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
	Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
	A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

12697	Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Pacidius Philalethi dialogue [1676], A6.3.565-6), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: This is incipient monadology, that the bottom level of division ceases to be parts of a thing, and arrives at a different order of entity, to explain the parts of things. Leibniz denies that this subdivision comes down to points.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11248	Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
	Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
	A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

16764	The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
	Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
	From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
	A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.