5 ideas
8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Priest and Routley have developed paraconsistent relevant logic. 'Relevant' logics insist on there being some sort of connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. 'Paraconsistent' logics allow contradictions. | |
From: report of Graham Priest (works [1998]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
A reaction: Relevance blocks the move of saying that a falsehood implies everything, which sounds good. The offer of paraconsistency is very wicked indeed, and they are very naughty boys for even suggesting it. |
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: It will ordinarily be conversationally inappropriate to say 'I know that p, but p might be false' even if it is true, since this would mislead an interlocutor to infer that that possibility was an epistemically significant one. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Epistemic') | |
A reaction: This seems to imply hypocrisy when a fallibilist philosopher claims (in non-philosophical company) to know something. Fair enough. Philosophers are in a permanent state of hypocrisy about what they are really thinking. That's the fun of it. |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: There has been a tendency to treat fallibilism as an alternative to either dogmatism or scepticism. ...But it is much better to think of fallibilism as consistent with either dogmatism or skepticism. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Closure') | |
A reaction: It seems perfectly reasonably to describe oneself as a 'fallibilist dogmatist' (perhaps from the Pope?), or a 'fallibilist sceptic' (perhaps from Peter Unger?), so this idea sounds correct. |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: It seems best to take fallible reasons as the basic notion of fallibilism. So fallible knowers are agents who know what they know on the basis of fallible reasons. Fallible knowledge will be knowledge on basis of fallible reasons. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Cognates') | |
A reaction: This is because an ideal knower would be compelled by the evidence, so if fallibilism is universal it must reside in the evidence and not in the knower (bottom p.131). |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |