2855
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In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Hare says words are secondarily evaluative (e.g. 'soft-hearted') if prescriptive meaning varies but description is constant; primarily evaluative words ('good', 'right', 'ought') are the opposite, with the descriptive content varying.
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From:
report of Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952]) by Brad W. Hooker - Prescriptivism p.640
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A reaction:
I would have thought that the prescriptive meaning of the evaluative word could at least vary in strength. You really, really ought to do that.
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16764
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The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
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Full Idea:
Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
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From:
Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
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A reaction:
A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
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16746
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Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton]
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Full Idea:
The (active) principles I consider not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specific forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed.
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From:
Isaac Newton (Queries to the 'Opticks' [1721], q 31), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
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A reaction:
This is the external, 'imposed' view of laws (with the matter passive) at its most persuasive. If laws arise out the stuff (as I prefer to think), what principles went into the formulation of the stuff?
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