Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'What is 'naturalized epistemology'?' and 'Making Things Happen'

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3 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304)
     A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
     Full Idea: On Woodward's manipulationist view, an explanation would take the form of a causal graph.
     From: report of James Woodward (Making Things Happen [2003]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1
     A reaction: The idea is that causation is all to do with how nature responds when you try to manipulate it. I'm certainly in favour of tying explanation closely to causation.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.