24 ideas
| 7278 | Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Words of wisdom are precise and clear. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I can only approve of this. The issue of clarity is much discussed amongs philosophers, especially in the analytic v continental debate. Note, therefore, the additional requirement to be 'precise'. Should we be less clear in order to be precise? |
| 7281 | Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Don't even start, let's just stay put. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: What a remarkable proposal! He seems frightened to make an omelette, because he will have to break an egg, or he might burn himself. I can't relate to this idea, but it's existence must be noted, like other scepticisms. |
| 7282 | Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The sage encompasses everything, while ordinary people just argue about things. Disagreement means you do not understand at all. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is why democracy and western analytical philosophy come as a package. We can't assume that our government is always right, and we can't assume that a 'sage' has managed to encompass everything. Criticism is essential! |
| 7284 | If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: If you get the better of me in a disagreement, rather than me getting the better of you, does this mean that you are automatically right and I am automatically wrong? | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Very nice. I don't, though, think that this invalidates the process of argument. What matters about such an exchange is the resulting reflection by the two parties. Only a fool thinks that he is right because he won, or wrong because he lost. |
| 23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Predicativists doubt the existence of sets with no predicative definition. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: This would imply that sets which encounter paradoxes when they try to be predicative do not therefore exist. Surely you can have a set of random objects which don't fall under a single predicate? |
| 23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The iterative conception justifies Power Set, but cannot justify a satisfactory theory of von Neumann ordinals, so ZFC appropriates Replacement from NBG set theory. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9) | |
| A reaction: The modern approach to axioms, where we want to prove something so we just add an axiom that does the job. |
| 23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The limitation of size conception of sets justifies the axiom of Replacement, but cannot justify Power Set, so NBG set theory appropriates the Power Set axiom from ZFC. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 09.9) | |
| A reaction: Which suggests that the Power Set axiom is not as indispensable as it at first appears to be. |
| 23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The sentence connective 'and' also has an order-sensitive meaning, when it means something like 'and then'. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: This is support the idea that orders are a feature of reality, just as much as possible concatenation. Relational predicates, he says, refer to series rather than to individuals. Nice point. |
| 23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The reason the two predicates 'before' and 'after' are needed is not to express different relations, but to indicate its order. Since there can be difference of order without difference of relation, the nature of relations is not the source of order. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: This point is to refute Russell's 1903 claim that order arises from the nature of relations. Hossack claims that it is ordered series which are basic. I'm inclined to agree with him. |
| 23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: The transfinite ordinal numbers are important in the theory of proofs, and essential in the theory of recursive functions and computability. Mathematics would be incomplete without them. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.1) | |
| A reaction: Hossack offers this as proof that the numbers are not human conceptual creations, but must exist beyond the range of our intellects. Hm. |
| 23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: I propose that numbers are properties, not sets. Magnitudes are a kind of property, and numbers are magnitudes. …Natural numbers are properties of pluralities, positive reals of continua, and ordinals of series. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Interesting! Since time can have a magnitude (three weeks) just as liquids can (three litres), it is not clear that there is a single natural property we can label 'magnitude'. Anything we can manage to measure has a magnitude. |
| 23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Numbers cannot be mental objects constructed by our own minds: there exists at most a potential infinity of mental constructions, whereas the axioms of mathematics require an actual infinity of numbers. | |
| From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro 2) | |
| A reaction: Doubt this, but don't know enough to refute it. Actual infinities were a fairly late addition to maths, I think. I would think treating fictional complete infinities as real would be sufficient for the job. Like journeys which include imagined roads. |
| 7289 | Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Do not try to do things. Do not try to master knowledge. ...Just be empty. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Stands as a nice challenge to the assumption that knowledge is a good thing. Aristotle's views make a nice contrast (Ideas 548 and 549). Personally I totally agree with Aristotle, and with the western tradition. |
| 23403 | You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Often after waking do you know that your dream was a dream. Still, there may be an even greater awakening after which you will know that this, too, was just a greater dream. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 02), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the key to the full horror of dream scepticism (as dramatised in the film 'The Matrix'). We can never know whether there is yet another awakening about to occur. |
| 7285 | Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Once I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flitting around and enjoying myself. Suddenly I woke and was Chuang Tzu again. But had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu? | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Plato (Idea 2047) also spotted this problem, later made famous by Descartes (Idea 2250). Given the size of a butterfly's brain, this suggests that Chuang Tzu was a dualist. What can't I take the idea seriously, when reason says I should? |
| 7277 | The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: As the saying goes, 'The perfect man has no self' | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be quoted with approval. This is interesting because it implies that lesser beings do have a self, and that having a self is a moral issue, and one which can be controlled. One could, I suppose, concentrate on externals. |
| 7286 | To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: When a man discerns his own self as irrelevant, he sees with true clarity. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Seeing 'with clarity' is only one of the ways of seeing, and one mustn't unquestioningly assume that it is the best. Wisdom should contemplate vision with and without the self, and then rise higher and compare the two views. Compare Parfit (Idea 5518). |
| 7279 | If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Our words are not just hot air. Words work because they are something, but the problem is that, if we cannot define a word's meaning, it doesn't really say anything. Can we make a case for it being anything different from the chirruping of chicks? | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This obviously points us towards Quine's challenge to analyticity, and hence the value of definitions (Ideas 1622 and 1624). Even for Chuang Tzu, it seems naïve to think that you cannot use a word well if you cannot define it. |
| 23404 | Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Words are for meaning: when you've gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 26), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.VI | |
| A reaction: 'What exactly did this person say?' 'Don't know, but I've given you the accurate gist'. This is such an obvious phenomenon that I amazed by modern philosophers who deny propositions, or deny meaning entirely. |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
| From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
| 7283 | Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Great courage is not violent. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A very nice remark. This, I think, is what the Greeks were struggling to say about courage, but they never quite pinned it down as Chuang Tzu does. |
| 7280 | As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: As all life is one, what need is there for words? | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: In a sense this is nonsense, but it has an appeal. I presume that God would not need words, any more than he would need arithmetic. Life is obviously a complex one, with parts which can be discussed. |
| 7288 | Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Don't struggle, go with the flow, and you will find yourself at one with the vastness of the void of Heaven. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Ugh. I've got all eternity to do that. The underlying assumption of Taoism seems to be that it is better not to have been born, and if you are thus unfortunate, you should try to pretend that it never happened. Much too negative for my taste. |
| 7287 | Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao. | |
| From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Strikingly different from Christianity. No wonder Europeans used to describe orientals as 'enigmatic'; the faces of Taoists presumably express indifference. Not for me, I'm afraid. I identify with my fellow humans, because of our shared predicaments. |