16 ideas
| 7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts. |
| 7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge. |
| 7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless. |
| 1564 | True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4) |
| 1559 | Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
| 1561 | Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
| 1560 | Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them? |
| 9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives. |
| 9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed. | |
| From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1) | |
| A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is. |
| 1567 | How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case? | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8) |
| 1563 | Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG] |
| Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest. | |
| From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds. |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
| From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
| 1562 | It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) | |
| A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc. |
| 1566 | The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7) |
| 1565 | We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)] |
| Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it. | |
| From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6) |