100 ideas
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are not invariably the best people, but the best philosophers I know are the best people I know. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], Pref) | |
A reaction: How very nicely expressed. I have often thought the same about lovers of literature, but been horribly disappointed by some of them. On the whole I have found philosophy-lovers to be slightly superior to literature-lovers! |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
Full Idea: Sharing a technical vocabulary is to share a tidy collection of assumptions. Reliance on that vocabulary serves to foreclose discussion of those assumptions. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], Pref) | |
A reaction: Love it! I am endlessly frustrated by papers that launch into a discussion using a terminology that is riddled with dubious prior assumptions. And that includes common terms like 'property', as well as obscure neologisms. |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
Full Idea: There is an unfortunate tendency to conflate epistemological issues bearing on explanation with issues in metaphysics. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.2) | |
A reaction: This is where Heil and I part ways. I just don't believe in the utterly pure metaphysics which he thinks we can do. Our drive to explain moulds our vision of reality, say I. |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
Full Idea: A capacity for abstraction is central to our capacity to think about the universe systematically. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 09.7) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as obvious. We pick out the similarities, and then discuss them, as separate from their bearers. We explain why things have features in common. Some would just say systematic thinking needs universals, but that's less good. |
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence. |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
Full Idea: All pairs of contraries entail a pair of contradictories, since one member of such a pair always entails the negation of the other. P&Q and not-P are contraries, but the first entails P, which is contradictory of not-P. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
Full Idea: Truth is a relation between a truthbearer and a truthmaker. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.02) | |
A reaction: This implies that all truths have truthmakers, which is fairly controversial. Heil himself denies it! |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
Full Idea: For millenia, philosophers operated with an implicit conception of truthmaking, a conception that remained unarticulated only because it was part of the very fabric of philosophy. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 07.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is an advance that we have brought it out into the open, and subjected it to critical study. Does Heil want us to return to it being unquestioned? I like truthmaking, but that can't be right. |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
Full Idea: I do not subscribe to the thesis that every truth requires a truthmaker. Mathematical truths and truths of logic are compatible with any way the universe could be. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.5) | |
A reaction: He makes that sound like a knock-down argument, but I'm not convinced. I see logic and mathematics as growing out of nature, though that is a very unfashionable view. I'm almost ashamed of it. But I'm not giving it up. See Carrie Jenkins. |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to think of an infinite number as a very large number. Infinite numbers differ qualitatively from finite numbers. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.5) | |
A reaction: He cites Dedekind's idea that a proper subset of an infinite number can match one-one with the number. Respectable numbers don't behave in this disgraceful fashion. This should be on the wall of every seminar on philosophy of mathematics. |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
Full Idea: I do not understand how structures could serve as truthmakers for mathematical truths, ...Mathematical truths are not true in virtue of any way the universe is. ...Mathematical truths hold, whatever ways the universe is. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.08) | |
A reaction: I like the idea of enquiring about truthmakers for mathematical truths (and my view is more empirical than Heil's), but I think it may be a misunderstanding to think that structures are intended as truthmakers. Mathematics just IS structures? |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
Full Idea: Categories we use to describe and explain our universe do not line up in the neat way reductive schemes require. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2) | |
A reaction: He takes reduction to be largely a relation between our categories, rather than between entities, so he is bound to get this result. He may be right. |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
Full Idea: Fundamental ontology is in the business of telling us what the universe must be like if any theory is true. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Heil is good at stating simple ideas simply. This seems to be a bold claim, but I think I agree with it. |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
Full Idea: Looking at what you quantify over reveals, at most, truths to which you are committed. What the ontology is, what the truthmakers are for these truths, is another matter, one tackled, if at all, only in the pursuit of fundamental physics. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.08) | |
A reaction: Exactly right. Nouns don't guarantee objects, verbs don't guarantee processes. If you want to know my ontological commitments, ask me about them! Don't infer them from the sentences I hold true, because they need interpreting. |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
Full Idea: The task of ontology is to spell out the fundamental categories of being. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.5) | |
A reaction: This is the aspiration of 'pure' metaphysics, which I don't quite believe in. There is too much convention involved, on the one hand, and physics on the other. |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
Full Idea: It is a measure of how far we have fallen that so few philosophers nowadays see any difficulty at all in the idea that relations have full ontological standing. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.4) | |
A reaction: We have 'fallen' because medieval metaphysicians didn't believe it. Russell seems to have started, and the tendency to derive ontology from logic has secured the belief in relations. How else can you be allowed to write aRb? I agree with Heil. |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
Full Idea: If causal relations are the manifesting of powers, then causal relations would appear to be a species of internal relation. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 07.4) | |
A reaction: The point being that any relations formed are entirely dependent on the internal powers of the relata. Sounds right. There are also non-causal relations, of course. |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
Full Idea: When a tomato depresses a scale, it does so in virtue of its mass - how it is masswise - and not in virtue of its colour or shape. Were we barred from saying such things, we would be unable to formulate truths about the fundamental things. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3) | |
A reaction: It doesn't follow that we have an ontological commitment to properties, but we certainly need to point out the obvious fact that things being one way rather than another makes a difference to what happens. |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
Full Idea: Categorical properties were introduced originally by philosophers bent on distinguishing properties possessed 'categorically', that is, actually, by objects from mere if-then, conditional properties, mere potentialities. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 04.3) | |
A reaction: He cites Ryle on dispositions in support. It is questionable whether it is a clear or useful distinction. Heil says the new distinction foreclosed the older more active view of properties. |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
Full Idea: If you are going to have emergent fundamental properties, you are going to need emergent fundamental substances as bearers of those properties. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.6) | |
A reaction: Presumably the theory of emergent properties (which I take to be nonsense, in its hardcore form) says that the substance is unchanged, but the property is new. Or else the bundle gives collective birth to a new member. Search me. |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
Full Idea: Only when you get to fundamental physics, do predicates begin to line up with properties. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2) | |
A reaction: A nice thought. I assume the actual properties of daily reality only connect to our predicates in very sloppy ways. I suppose our fundamental predicates have to converge on the actual properties, because the fog clears. Sort of. |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
Full Idea: It may be that F applies truly to a because F is a determinable predicate satisfied by a's possession of a property answering to a determinate of that determinable predicate. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.01) | |
A reaction: Heil aims to break the commitment of predicates to the existence of properties. The point is that there is no property 'coloured' to correspond to 'a is coloured'. Red might be the determinate that does the job. Nice. |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
Full Idea: Properties are central to the universe's causal order in a way that sets could not possibly be. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3) | |
A reaction: The idea that properties actually are sets is just ridiculous. It may be that you can treat them as sets and get by quite well. The sets can be subsumed into descriptions of causal processes (or something). |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers who embrace properties as powers hold that every property is a power (Bird), or that some properties are qualities and some are powers (Ellis; Molnar). The latter include powers which are 'grounded in' qualities (Mumford). | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 04.4) | |
A reaction: I don't like Heil's emphasis on 'qualities', which seems to imply their phenomenal rather than their real aspect. I'm inclined to favour the all-powers view, but can't answer the question 'but what HAS these powers?' Stuff is intrinsically powerful. |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
Full Idea: In my account of properties they are at once qualitative and dispositional: properties are powerful qualities. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 05.1) | |
A reaction: I have never managed to understand what Heil means by 'qualities'. Is he talking about the phenomenal aspects of powers? Does he mean categorical properties. I can't find an ontological space for his things to slot into. |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
Full Idea: It would be difficult to understand the popularity of 'abstract entities' - numbers, sets, propositions - in the absence of an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of truthmakers. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07) | |
A reaction: I love Idea 18496, because it leads us towards a better account of modality, but dislike this one because it reveals that the truthmaking idea has led us to a very poor theory. Truthmaking is a good question, but not much of an answer? |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
Full Idea: Substances, as property bearers, must be simple; substances of necessity lack constituents that are themselves substances. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.3) | |
A reaction: How can he think that this is a truth of pure metaphysics? A crowd has properties because we think of it as a simple substance, not because it actually is one. Can properties have properties? Are tree and leaf both substances? |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
Full Idea: An object is not made up of its spatial parts: spatial parts are regions of some object. ...Complex objects, wholes, are made up of, and so depend on, their substantial parts. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably objects also 'depend on' their spatial parts, so I am not convinced that we have a sharp distinction here. |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
Full Idea: Blancmange 'gunky' universes are not just universes with an endless number of parts. Rather a blancmange universe is a universe with no simple parts, no parts themselves lacking parts. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Lewis seemed to think it was parts all the way down. Is gunk homogeneous stuff, or what is endlessly subdividable, or an infinite shrinking of parts? We demand clarity. |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
Full Idea: A whole - or some wholes - might be thought to survive gradual replacement of its parts, perhaps, but not their elimination. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.1) | |
A reaction: You can't casually replace the precious golden parts of a statue with cheap lead ones. It depends on whether the parts matter. Nevertheless this is a really important idea in metaphysics. It enables the s=Ship of Theseus to survive some change. |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
Full Idea: A sand dune depends on the individual grains of sand that make it up. In an important sense, however, a line's segments depend on the line rather than it on them. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.4) | |
A reaction: The illustrations are not clear cut. As you cut off segments of the line, you reduce its length. Heil is hoping for something neat here, but I don't think he has quite got. The difficulty of trying to do pure metaphysics! |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
Full Idea: If electrons and gravitational fields have definite natures, why not reality itself? And if reality has a nature, if this makes sense, then reality grounds the deepest necessities of all. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.09) | |
A reaction: Nice speculation! Scientists and verificationists seem to cry 'foul!' when philosophers offer such wild speculations, but I say that's exactly what we pay them do. I'm not sure whether I understand reality having its own nature, though! |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
Full Idea: If the other possible worlds are merely useful fictions, we are left wondering what the truthmakers for all those modal judgements might be. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07) | |
A reaction: I suddenly see that this is the train of thought that led me to believe in real powers and dispositions, and which retrospectively led me to love the truthmaker idea. Even real Lewisian worlds don't seem adequate as truthmakers here. |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: On the causal model of explanation, understanding is unmysterious and objective; it is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge; knowledge of causes. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: There seems to be some distinction between revealing some causes, and revealing a cause which 'makes the light dawn'. |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: How can Best Explanation distinguish negative evidence from irrelevant evidence, when the evidence is logically consistent with the hypothesis? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
A reaction: There seems no answer to this other than to assess batches of evidence by their coherence, rather than one at a time. Anomalies can be conclusive, or pure chance. |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The inferential path to unobservables is often the same as to unobserved observables. In these two sorts of case, the reason for belief can be equally strong, so the suggestion that we infer truth in one case but not the other seems perverse. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: [Van Fraassen 1980 is the target of this] Van F seems to be in the grip of some sort of verificationism, which I always disliked on the grounds that speculation can be highly meaningful. Why embrace something because it 'could' be observed? |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') | |
A reaction: This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle. |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations are an important guide to inference, …we work out what to infer from our evidence by thinking about what would explain that evidence. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], Pref 2nd ed) | |
A reaction: I take this to be inferences about the physical world, rather than of pure logic. The thesis sounds a bit thin, since there is no logical sense of 'infer' here, so all it could mean is 'what caused that?'. |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are more impressed by the fact that the special theory of relativity was used to predict the shift in the perihelion of Mercury than we would have been if we knew that the theory was constructed in order to account for that effect. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 10 'The fudging') | |
A reaction: Lipton has a nice discussion of the relative merits of predicting data and accommodating it. He invites astrologers to predict events, rather than accommodate past ones. |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Accommodations are often worth less than predictions, because only they have to face the possibility that the best explanation of the fit between the theory and data is that the theoretical system was fudged. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
A reaction: Lipton illuminatingly explores the discovery by Semmelweiss of the cause of childbed fever. He predicted various explanations, and tested them out in a hospital. It clicks when the prediction occurs. |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The cost of the hypothetico-deductive method …is that we are left in the dark about the source of the hypotheses themselves. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: How do we distinguish a wild hypothesis from a plausible one? It can only be from patterns in the data, rather than mere accumulations of data. If water causes cholera, or smoking causes cancer, the hypothesis guides the data search. |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Five attempts to describe induction are 'more of the same', the instantial model, the hypothetico-deductive model, the Bayesian approach …and causal inference. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This interesting list totally fails to mention the best answer, which is essentialism! If you observe some instances, you only begin to think that there will be more of the same if you think you have discerned the essence. Ravens are black things! |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
Full Idea: One of the problems of the extrapolation and instantial models of confirmation is that they do not cover vertical inferences, where we infer from what we observe to something at a different level that is often unobservable. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: This is my preferred essentialist view of induction, that we don't just infer that future swans will be white, but also that whiteness is built into the biology of swans. There seems to be predictive induction and explanatory induction. |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
Full Idea: There is nothing illegitimate about giving arguments for beliefs one already holds. …So inductive justification of induction, while impotent against the skeptic, is legitimate for those who already rely on induction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
A reaction: Not so fast! The first sentence is generally right, but if the 'beliefs one already holds' are beliefs about methods of argument, that is a different case. Compare 'this book is the word of God, because it says so in the book'. Can logic prove logic? |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
Full Idea: If an inference is inductive, then by definition it is underdetermined by the evidence and the rules of deduction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court? |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens. |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Without something like a hypothesis about the genes of ravens, we simply do not know what would count as a relevantly similar bird for comparison. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: Lipton is endorsing the view that explanation should be 'contrastive', as well as aiming to discover the inner nature of ravens. He makes a good case for the contrastive approach. |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are considering that there is something in ravens, a gene perhaps, that makes them black, and this cause is part of the essence of ravens. Birds lacking this cause could not interbreed with ravens. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: At last, the essentialist approach to induction! Of course, it is tricky to decide a priori whether there could be albino ravens. It only takes one white (interbreeding) raven to ruin a nice essentialist story. Individuals matter. |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The reason my shoe is white is not that it lacks some feature essential to ravens that makes them black. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'The Method') | |
A reaction: Good, but not totally true. If my shoes were made to grow from genes, and then had some raven spliced into them, we might manage it. That is an explanation, but a long way from the best one. Enquiry is explanations, not deductions. |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In p(H|E) = p(E|H)p(H)/p(E), the left side is the 'posterior' probability of H given E, p(E|H) is the 'likelihood' of E given H, and the others are the 'priors' of H and E. Moving from right to left is known as 'conditionalization'. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Since the Bayesian account says a hypothesis is confirmed by any of its logical consequences …it seems to inherit the over-permissiveness of the hypothetico-deductive model. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This sounds like Hempel's Raven Paradox, where the probability of some logical consequences seems impossible to assess. |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In English, Bayes's Theorem says that there is a high confirmation when your hypothesis entails an unlikely prediction that turns out to be correct - a very plausible claim. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: Presumably the simple point is that a likely prediction could have been caused by many things, but an unlikely prediction will probably only be caused by that thing. |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanisms by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
A reaction: Lipton's strategy for making peace between IBE and Bayesians. Explanations give likeliness. The background question for Bayesians always seems to be how the initial probabilities are assigned. Pure logic won't do that job. |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanation is a partial answer to the descriptive problem of induction, …but the justificatory problem is recalcitrant, since it may seem particularly implausible that explanatory considerations should be a reliable guide to truth. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: His claim that explanation is a guide to inference is intended to bridge the gap. One might say that a good explanation has to be true, so just make sure your explanation is 'good', according to a few criteria. |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the reason model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is to give a reason to believe that the phenomenon occurs. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hempel 1965] Put like that, it doesn't sound very promising. Personally I believe things occur if my wife tells me they do, because I trust her. Lipton says knowing that it occurs is not understanding why it occurs. |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
Full Idea: On the 'familiarity' model of explanation, unfamiliar phenomena call for explanation, and good explanations somehow make them familiar. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: Lipton notes that his encourages explanation by analogy, but that may not add to understanding. A better version is that an explanation makes a phenomenon less surprising (but that sounds rather relative and subjective). |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The question about explanation can be put this way: What has to be added to knowledge to yield understanding? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Underst') | |
A reaction: In the spirit of Aristotle, I take 'understanding' to be the end of all enquiry, even if it's rather open-ended, relative and vague. Presumably there are lots of true explanations which don't deliver understanding, because baffling ingredients are cited. |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
Full Idea: One of the points of our obsessive search for explanations is that this is a peculiarly effective way of discovering the structure of the world. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: This remark is a nice corrective to the sceptical view that explanations are entirely subjective, pragmatic, and even conventional. Whether this means that there are 'real' and 'objective' explanations is another matter. |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In a 'contrastive' explanation what gets explained is not 'Why this?', but 'Why this rather than that?'. There is a fact and a foil, and one fact may have several foils. Why do leaves turn yellow in November rather than in January? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: Lipton really likes this, and builds his story around it. Maybe, but it looks to me like an easier step towards a proper explanation. The foils are infinite. Why turn yellow rather than radioactive, insincere, divisible by three, or expensive? |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The class of possible causes is often too big, …but if we are lucky or clever enough to find or produce a contrast where fact and foil have similar histories, most potential explanations are immediately 'cancelled out', and we have a research programme. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
A reaction: He has a nice example of a triumph in 19th century German epidemiology. Once you get a good hypothesis, you can set up comparisons, based on a possible fact and a good foil. Genius is spotting hypothesis and foil. Nice. |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the 'unification' model of explanation, we come to understand a phenomenon when we see how it fit together with other phenomena into unified whole. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Kitcher 1989] This works quite well for a lot of explanation, but a revolutionary explanation might involve a completely new theory. Lipton says it is rather linguistic, and has no room for a regress of causes, or for singular explanations. |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Deduction models of explanation make it far too easy to explain. You can explain that planets move in an ellipse from the conjunction of the fact that they do, together with any law you please, say a law in economics. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Many ordinary explanations include no laws and allow no deduction, yet are not incomplete or mere sketches. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: The simplest sort of explanation simply shows the underlying cause. |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The hypothetico-deductive model does not account for the negative impact of explanatory failure. We reject hypotheses because they fail to explain contrasts, not because they are logically incompatible with them. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: The general move in modern accounts of investigation is away from an excessive emphasis on logic that used to be favoured. The underpinning of this is that science concerns mechanisms more than equations. |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the 'necessity' model of explanation, an explanation shows that the phenomenon in question had to occur. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Glymour 1980] Lipton objects that the sort of necessity involved is too uncertain, can't account for the 'why-regress', and doesn't fit everyday explanation, like why we abandoned the football match. |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: I take it that we may think about causes without thinking especially about explanations, and so we might judge likeliest cause without considering loveliest explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the causal model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is simply to give information about its causal history, or, where the phenomenon is itself a causal regularity, to give information about the mechanism linking cause and effect. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: [He cites Lewis's 1986 paper] Simply citing causal regularity seems to me to explain nothing. It happened because it always happens. Mechanism, on the other hand, is just what we are after. |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Mathematical explanations are never causal, and philosophical explanations seldom are. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: There may still be a 'direction' of explanation in mathematics, as when the nature of the triangle explains the Pythagoras Theorem, but the theorem may not give you the basic nature of triangles. Lipton suggests 'determination' for 'causation'. |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: It is often easier to say what a factor would explain than it is to say what it would cause. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Presumably the presence of some factor might explain something, but the factor itself might have mysterious causal powers. A catalyst, for example. We don't need to understand the factor that explains. |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Our most secure basis for causal inference is manipulation, as when flicking the switch causes the light to go on. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Correct, but Woodward elevates this into an entire theory of causation, which does not convince me. |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We understand a phenomenon better when we know not just what caused it, but how the cause operated. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
A reaction: This is the key point behind the desire for 'mechanism' in explanation. It strikes me as undeniable. |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
Full Idea: If all we wanted was to maximise probability, we would never venture beyond our data. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'friends') |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We should considere Inference to the Loveliest Potential Explanation, …which links the search for truth and the search for understanding in a fundamental way. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: A suspicion is that Inference to the Best Explanation is nothing more than Inference to the Likeliest Cause in fancy dress, and so fails to account for the symptoms of likeliness. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: In a lot of cases the cause is the explanation. An explanation might be the absence of a cause (as in 'you forgot to switch it on'). Lipton's 'lovely' explanations go further, and reveal a network of causes. |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The core idea of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. …Inserting one of the standard models of explanation yields disappointing results, because of their backward state. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: Inferences tend to come one at a time, but I see best explanations as the formation of coherent pictures. The tricky bit is when to decide the coherence makes it acceptable. Lipton has that problem too, with his inferences. 'Working explanations'. |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between the explanation best supported by the evidence, and the explanation that would provide the most understanding: in short, between the 'likeliest' and the 'loveliest' explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: A very nice, very real and very illuminating distinction. Presumably truth must play an important role in both likelihood and loveliness. |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to Inference to the Best Explanation we do not infer the best actual explanation; rather we infer that the best of the available potential explanations is an actual explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: Clearly to say that you should just accept the best available explanation is asking for trouble, if all the available explanations are absurd. But what are the criteria for saying the best one is the actual one? |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The slogan 'Inference to the Best Explanation' may bring to mind an excessively passive picture of scientific enquiry, …but there is the feedback between hypothesis formation and data acquisition that characterises actual enquiry. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: Perhaps it should be renamed 'Search for the Best Explanation'. |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are to infer that a difference marks a cause just in case the difference would provide the best explanation of the contrast. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'Improved') | |
A reaction: Lipton's offers this as his distinctive contribution to Mill's methods of enquiry. His point is that we draw inferences for explanatory reasons. He rests on Mill, and on contrastive explanation. It sounds rightish, but a bit optimistic. |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations can play a role in the generation of potential explanations as well as in the subsequent selection from among them. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'The two-stage') | |
A reaction: Lipton offers this to meet an obvious objection to Inference to the Best Explanation - that compiling the possible explanations seems to need guidance. Seems a good reply. |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Two problems for IBE are that only one explanation can be inferred from any set of data, and that the only data that are relevant to a hypothesis are data the hypothesis explains. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: I don't see why the theory prohibits a tie for what is 'best', given that you don't have to commit. The second one is partly to do with what observers should do about anomalies, and it is sometimes right to ignore them. |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Bayesians object to inference to the best explanation, because someone who favoured powerful ('lovely') explanations would end up with an incoherent distribution of states of belief. They would be persuaded by loss-making wagers (a 'dutch book'). | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Van Fraassen 1989 Ch.7] Lipton's Ch. 7 tries to address this issue. |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The best theory is almost always boring. …The claim that all planets move in ellipses is interesting, and the claim that some do not is not interesting. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') | |
A reaction: This applies to any extraction of a universal 'law' by induction. The best theory just affirms what has been observed. How could generalising about what you haven't observed be 'better'? Answer: because it goes via the essence. |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Inference to the best explanation cannot be epistemically effective, since an actual explanation must be true, so one would have to know the truth before one could infer an explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: Lipton rests on 'contrastive' explanation, so that the one that explains more is more likely to be true. If true, it explains. That seems to me correct, even though it could occasionally go horribly wrong. Approach explanation cautiously. |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
Full Idea: Talk of abstraction and 'partial consideration' (Locke) does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent. In abstracting, you attend to what is there to be considered. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 05.7) | |
A reaction: Quite so. The point is to focus on aspects of reality. Does anyone seriously doubt that reality has 'aspects'? |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
Full Idea: Existing things are particular, and generality is a feature of our ways of representing the universe. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.1) | |
A reaction: This is right, and expressed with beautiful simplicity. How could anyone disagree with this? But they do! |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
Full Idea: You can entertain thoughts of things like tomatoes without a grasp of what they are. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.10) | |
A reaction: Lowe seemed to think that you had to grasp the generic essence of a tomato before you could think about it, but I agree entirely with Heil. |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
Full Idea: Non-conscious thought need not resemble conscious thought occurring out of sight. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10) |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
Full Idea: Thinking - ordinary conscious thinking - is imagistic. This is so for 'linguistic' or 'sentential' thoughts as well as for patently non-linguistic thoughts. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10) | |
A reaction: This claim (that linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought) strikes me as an excellent insight. |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
Full Idea: I like to think that the subject-predicate form reflects a fundamental division in reality. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 10.1) | |
A reaction: That is, he defends the idea that there are substances, and powerful qualities pertaining to those substances. I sympathise, but this slogan makes it too simple. |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
Full Idea: It is the difficulty in imagining what truthmakers for normative judgements might be that leads many philosophers to find 'moral realism' unappealing. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07) | |
A reaction: I like that a lot. My proposal for metaethics is that it should be built on the concept of a 'value-maker' |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
Full Idea: In a universe containing an infinite number of electrons would mass-energy be conserved? ...Electrons could come and go without affecting the total mass-energy. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very persuasive reason for doubting that the universe contains an infinite number of electrons. In fact I suspect that infinite numbers have no bearing on nature at all. (Actually, I suspect them of being fictions). |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
Full Idea: I believe our understanding of causation would benefit from a shift of attention from causal sequences and laws, to instances of causation: 'causings'. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.1) | |
A reaction: His aim is to get away from generalities, and focus on the actual operation of powers which is involved. He likes the case of two playing cards propped against one another. I'm on his side. Laws come last in the story, and should not come first. |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
Full Idea: The label 'probabilistic causation' is misleading. What you have is not a weakened or tentative kind of causing, but a probability of there being a cause. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.5) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'probabilistic causation' strikes me as an empty philosophers' concoction, so I agree with Heil. |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient? |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
Full Idea: Although it is convenient to speak of electrons as particles or elementary substances, when they enter into relations they can 'lose their individuality. Then an electron becomes a kind of 'abstract particular', a way a given system is, a mode. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.7) | |
A reaction: Heil rightly warns us against basing our metaphysics on disputed theories of quantum mechanics. |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
Full Idea: Maybe the universe is fine-tuned as it is, not because things happened to fall out as they did during and immediately after the Big Bang, or because God so ordained it, but because God or the Big Bang had no choice. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.09) | |
A reaction: You'd be hard put to so why it had to be fine-tuned, so this seems to be a nice speculation. Unverifiable but wholly meaningful. Maybe the stuff fine-tunes itself, by mutual interaction. Or it is the result of natural selection (Lee Smolin). |