Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives' and 'Quodlibeta'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
16657 Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
     Full Idea: Among creatures there are only three 'res' belong to the three first categories: Substance, Quantity and Quality. All other are aspects [rationes] and intellectual concepts with respect to them, with reality only as grounded on the res of those three.
     From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3
     A reaction: Pasnau connects with the 'arrangement of being', giving an 'ontologically innocent' structure to reality. That seems to be what we all want, if only we could work out the ontologically guilty bit.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16658 The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
     Full Idea: There is beyond a doubt nothing real in the category of Relation, except what is a thing from another category.
     From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3
     A reaction: This seems to have been the fairly orthodox scholastic view of relations.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16645 Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
     Full Idea: Accidents are beings only in a qualified and diminished sense, because they are not called beings, nor are they beings, except because they are dispositions of an unqualified being, a substance.
     From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], XV.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.4
     A reaction: This is aimed to 'half' detach the accidents (as the Eucharist requires). Later scholastics detached them completely. Late scholastics seem to have drifted back to Henry's view. The equivocal use of 'being' here was challenged later.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22012 Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Kant claimed that things-in-themselves caused our sensations; but causality was a transcendental condition of experience, not a property of things-in-themselves, so the great Kant had contradicted himself.
     From: report of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], Supplement) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
     A reaction: This early objection by the conservative Jacobi (who disliked Enlightenment rational religion) is the key to the dispute over whether Kant is an idealist. Kant denied being an idealist, but how can he be, if this idea is correct?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15)
     A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules.
23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
     Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161)
     A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16764 The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
     Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18)
     A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
     Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164)
     A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion.