10 ideas
| 13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Descartes founded analytic geometry on the assumption that there is a one-one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1 |
| 16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Descartes thinks it is a pointless relic of scholastic metaphysics to dispute over the boundaries between substances and mere aggregates. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6 | |
| A reaction: This is Pasnau's carefully considered conclusion, with which others may not agree. It presumably captures the attitude of modern science generally to such issues. |
| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
| Full Idea: If it is intellectually required that one try to believe all and only truths (as Chisholm says), ...then it is possible to believe some unsubstantiated proposition in a reckless endeavour to believe a truth, and happen to be right. | |
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Justification') | |
| A reaction: This implies doxastic voluntarism. Sorry! I meant, this implies that we can control what we believe, when actually we believe what impinges on us as facts. |
| 7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind. |
| 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
| Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require. | |
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic') | |
| A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge. |
| 4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: We have inner awareness of our freedom. | |
| From: René Descartes (works [1643]) | |
| A reaction: This begs a few questions. I may be directly aware that I have not been hypnotised, but no one would accept it as proof. |
| 6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Descartes himself was well aware of the interaction problem, and corresponded uncomfortably with Princess Elizabeth on the matter; …he pointed out that gravity is causal despite not being a physical object. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William Lycan - Consciousness n1.3 | |
| A reaction: Lycan observes that at least gravity is in space-time, unlike the Cartesian mind. Pierre Gassendi had pointed out the problem to Descartes in the Fifth Objection to the 'Meditations' (see Idea 3400). |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
| From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
| 19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: It is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5 | |
| A reaction: His dualism is crucial, along with his ontological argument, because they make all mentality supernatural. Remember, for Descartes animals are mindless machines. |
| 6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Notoriously, the Cartesian idea that matter is purely geometrical will not do, for it leaves no distinction between matter and empty volumes: a filler for these volumes is required. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (works [1643]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.3 | |
| A reaction: Descartes thinks of matter as 'extension'. Descartes's error seems so obvious that it is a puzzle why he made it. He may have confused epistemology and ontology - all we can know of matter is its extension in space. |