14216
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The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved']
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From:
Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
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A reaction:
Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places.
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14218
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A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata?
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From:
Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
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A reaction:
He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation.
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12165
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Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
According to the Romantic theory music was an expression of something, of an idea (Hegel), of the Will (Schopenhauer), of 'intuitions' (Croce), or of feelings (Collingwood).
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From:
Roger Scruton (The Nature of Musical Expression [1981], p.54)
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A reaction:
Deryck Cooke was the culmination of music as expression of feeling, and Stravinsky was the greatest rebel against the whole idea of expression in music. You can set out to create interesting music which does or does not grab the emotions.
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16764
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The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
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Full Idea:
Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
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From:
Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
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A reaction:
A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
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