Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Persistence, Change and Explanation' and 'Inventing Logical Necessity'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
13931 By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian method of working form aporia allows one to use as starting points not only what is said by 'the many', but also what is said by 'the wise', including philosophers.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1 n2)
     A reaction: [She mentions Nussbaum 1986:ch 7 for the opposing view] I like this thought a lot. Aristotle's democratic respect for widespread views can be a bit puzzling sometimes.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13925 Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Disputes over ontology derive from more fundamental disputes over forms of explanation.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1)
     A reaction: It immediately strikes me that Haslanger has stolen my master idea, but unfortunately the dating suggests that she has priority. The tricky part is to combine this view with realism.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
13924 The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: The notion that things persist through change is deeply embedded in ideas we have about explanation, and in particular, in the idea that the present is constrained by the past.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1)
     A reaction: I take this to be both an important and an attractive idea. Deniers of persistence (4D-ists) will presumably have some ability to explain the present, but it is the idea of the present being 'constrained' by the past which is a challenge.
13930 Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Persistence offers intelligibility: the possibility of understanding a change, and of understanding the products of it.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 8)
     A reaction: I think this is exactly right, and it is a powerful idea with wide implications for metaphysics. Haslanger claims that an understanding of 'substance' is needed, which leads towards my defence of essentialism.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: If the world of time-slices is to be explicable, then it must be possible to provide explanations of change understood as a continual generation and destruction of these 'momentary entities'.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: While fans of time-slices can offer some sort of explanation, in the process of explaining a 'worm', there don't seem to be the sort of causal chains that we traditionally rely on. Maybe there are no explanations of anything?
13928 If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: How is the case in which A exists prior to B, but is distinct from B, different (especially from B's point of view) from the case in which nothing exists prior to B?
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: I sympathise with her view, but this isn't persuasive. For A substitute 'Sally's mother' and for B substitute 'Sally'. A 4D-ist could bite the bullet and say that, indeed, previous parts of my 'worm' need not have existed.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12189 Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Wright espouses a non-realist, indeed non-cognitive account of logical necessity. Crucial to this is the idea that acceptance of a statement as necessary always involves an element of decision (to use it in a necessary way).
     From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §3
     A reaction: This has little appeal to me, as I take (unfashionably) the view that that logical necessity is rooted in the behaviour of the actual physical world, with which you can't argue. We test simple logic by making up examples.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Natural explanations work by showing the systematic causal interconnections between things.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: On the whole I love this sort of idea, but I am wondering if this one prevents mathematical or logical explanations from being natural.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
13926 Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: I am not resting my ontology on a simple 'argument to the best explanation'. ..What I want to say is that there are general demands on a kind of explanation, in particular, natural explanation, which require that there are persisting things.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 5)
     A reaction: This is a really nice idea - that best explanation is not just about specific cases, but also about best foundations for explanations in general, which brings in our metaphysics. I defend the role of essences in these best explanations.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
7320 Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]
     Full Idea: Crispin Wright has argued that Quine's holism is implausible because it is actually incoherent: he claims that Quine's holism cannot provide us with a coherent account of scientific methodology.
     From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.5
     A reaction: This sounds promising, given my intuitive aversion to linguistic holism, and almost everything to do with Quine. Scientific methodology is not isolated, but spreads into our ordinary (experimental) interactions with the world (e.g. Idea 2461).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16764 The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.