Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed)' and 'Brandom on Social Practices and Representations'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
     Full Idea: If we cannot check our language against non-linguistic awareness, then philosophy can never be more than a discussion of the utility and compatibility of beliefs - and, more particularly, of the various vocabularies in which those beliefs are formulated.
     From: Richard Rorty (Brandom on Social Practices and Representations [1998], iii.127), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.178
     A reaction: I'm amazed at how many people I encounter in philosophy circles (compared with none at all outside those circles) who seem to think that we cannot check our language against our non-linguistic awareness. Rorty is their guru. Weird.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
     Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'.
     From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9)
     A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.