23881
|
All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
|
|
Full Idea:
All reflections bearing on the notion of value and on the hierarchy of values is philosophical; all efforts of thought bearing on anything other than value are, if one examines them closely, foreign to philosophy.
|
|
From:
Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.30)
|
|
A reaction:
If nothing else proves that Weil is a platonist, this does. She, of course, has a transcendent and religious view of values, whereas I just see them as concepts which embody what is important. That said, I'm not far off agreeing with this.
|
22449
|
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
|
|
From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
|
|
A reaction:
True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
|
22451
|
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
|
|
From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
|
|
A reaction:
There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
|
23882
|
Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
|
|
Full Idea:
Everything that can be taken as an end cannot be defined. Means, such as power and money, are easily defined, and that is why people orient themselves exclusively towards the acquisition of means.
|
|
From:
Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.31)
|
|
A reaction:
Nice, but too neat, because so many activities can be treated either as means or as ends, and often as both. It makes sense that people pursue what is clear to them.
|
22452
|
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
|
|
From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
|
|
A reaction:
Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
|
16764
|
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
|
|
Full Idea:
Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
|
|
From:
Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
|
|
A reaction:
A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
|