Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Reflections on my Critics' and 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12129 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
     Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5)
     A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
6809 Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
     Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8
     A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
12128 In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
     Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6)
     A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817).
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action.
     From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
     A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16764 The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.