3 ideas
| 9879 | NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Quine's New Foundations system of set theory, devised with no model in mind, but on the basis of a hunch that a purely formal restriction on the comprehension axiom would block all contradictions. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (New Foundations for Mathematical Logic [1937]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.18 | |
| A reaction: The point is that Quine (who had an ontological preference for 'desert landscapes') attempted to do without an ontological commitment to objects (and their subsequent models), with a purely formal system. Quine's NF is not now highly regarded. |
| 14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers. | |
| From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level. |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
| From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |