14 ideas
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
Full Idea: It might be said that Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle. | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02) | |
A reaction: I don't buy this, if it meant to be dismissive of the relevance of the principle to truth. A deep question might be, what is so aesthetically attractive about simplicity? I'm inclined to think that application of the Razor has delivered terrific results. |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
Full Idea: A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point? | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02) | |
A reaction: See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too. |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
Full Idea: There belongs to truthfulness not only the avoidance of lying but also that other kind of attachment to truth which has to do with its preservation and pursuit. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.74) | |
A reaction: This is truth as a value, rather than as a mere phenomenon of accurate thought and speech. The importance of 'preserving' the truth is the less common part of this idea. |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties. | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09) | |
A reaction: [Lycan cites Castaņeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be. |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
Full Idea: A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events. | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09) | |
A reaction: Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic! |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
Full Idea: I believe the only promising choice of actual entities to serve as 'worlds' is that of sets of intensional objects, such as propositions or properties with stipulated interrelations. | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 12) | |
A reaction: This is mainly in response to Lewis's construction of them out of actual concrete objects. It strikes me as a bogus problem. It is just a convenient way to think precisely about possibilities, and occasionally outruns our mental capacity. |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
Full Idea: If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility. | |
From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09) | |
A reaction: [Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds. |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted. | |
From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763. |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
Full Idea: For consequentialists there will be nothing that it will not be right to do to a perfectly innocent individual, if that is the only way of preventing another agent from doing more things of the same kind. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.61) | |
A reaction: This is her generalised version that Williams dramatised as Jim and the Indians. Roughly, if you achieve a good outcome, it matters little how it is achieved. Foot sees consequentialism as the main problem with utilitarianism. |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
Full Idea: It is not that maximum welfare or 'the best outcome' stands outside morality as it foundation and arbiter, but rather that it appears within morality as the end of one of the virtues. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.73) | |
A reaction: She cites justice and benevolence as aiming at different (and even conflicting) outcomes. I'm not sure about her distinction between 'outside' and 'within' morality. I suppose a virtuously created end is a moral end, unlike mere good states of affairs. |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
Full Idea: The idea of the goodness of total states of affairs played no part in Aristotle's moral philosophy, and in modern times plays not part either in Rawls's account of justice or in the theories of more thoroughgoing contractualists such as Scanlon. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.76) | |
A reaction: We can add Kant to that. But if the supremely good state of affairs were permanently achieved, would that make morality irrelevant? A community of the exceptionally virtuous would not need the veil of ignorance, or contracts. |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
Full Idea: We should ask why we think that it makes sense to talk about morally good and bad states of affairs. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.68) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in her attack on consequentialism. There is nothing 'morally' good about my football team winning a great victory. |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
Full Idea: Morality is thought of as a kind of tacit legislation by the community. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.75) | |
A reaction: Foot presents this as a utilitarian doctrine, because the tacit legislation is felt to produce the best outcomes. This is Nietzsche's good and evil, beyond which he wished to go (presumably following other values). |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
Full Idea: It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62) | |
A reaction: This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it. |